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Agency, Responsibility, Selves, and the Mechanical Mind

Fiorella Battaglia

Philosophies January 20, 2021 DOI: 10.3390/philosophies6010007 (opens in new tab) via DOAJ

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Moral issues arise not only when neural technology directly affects people's lives but also when its interventions indirectly conceptualize the mind in new ways. The paper reviews theories of consciousness, subjectivity, and third-person perspectives on the brain, particularly as applied to an "extended mind," and identifies a major transformation in philosophy of action. This transformation is understood through additional epistemic devices, including a legal perspective on regulating human–machine interaction and a personality theory of the symbiotic connection between human and machine. The author argues this is a new area of philosophical concern characterized by self-objectification, which becomes "alienation" following Ernst Kapp's philosophy of technology. The paper contends that intervening in the brain can affect how we conceptualize the mind and modify its predicaments.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Brain–computer interface bci Human–robot interaction Mind Sense of agency Alienation
Key finding Argues that intervening in the brain via neural technology can affect how we conceptualize the mind and modify its predicaments, leading to self-objectification and alienation.

Abstract

Moral issues arise not only when neural technology directly influences and affects people’s lives, but also when the impact of its interventions indirectly conceptualizes the mind in new, and unexpected ways. It is the case that theories of consciousness, theories of subjectivity, and third person perspective on the brain provide rival perspectives addressing the mind. Through a review of these three main approaches to the mind, and particularly as applied to an “extended mind”, the paper identifies a major area of transformation in philosophy of action, which is understood in terms of additional epistemic devices—including a legal perspective of regulating the human–machine interaction and a personality theory of the symbiotic connection between human and machine. I argue this is a new area of concern within philosophy, which will be characterized in terms of self-objectification, which becomes “alienation” following Ernst Kapp’s philosophy of technology. The paper argues that intervening in the brain can affect how we conceptualize the mind and modify its predicaments.

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