This paper examines the constraints that the free-energy principle (FEP) places on possible model of consciousness, particularly models of attentional control and imaginative experiences, including episodic memory and planning. We first rehearse the classical and quantum formulations of the FEP, focusing on their application to multi-component systems, in which only some components interact...
This paper aims to assess whether the recently proposed "inner screen model" of consciousness that follows from the free-energy principle (FEP) can be regarded as a minimal unifying model (MUM) of consciousness, thereby providing a common foundational model for consciousness studies, and integrating approaches to consciousness based on the FEP. We first present the inner screen model, which...
This paper presents a model of consciousness that follows directly from the free- energy principle (FEP). We first rehearse the classical and quantum formulations of the FEP. In particular, we consider the “inner screen hypothesis” that follows from the quantum information theoretic version of the FEP. We then review applications of the FEP to the known sparse (nested and hierarchical)...
Higher-order Thought (HOT) theories of consciousness typically claim that conscious experience is a matter of a mental state's being represented by a HOT which is itself normally an unconscious state. Self-representational (SR) theorists have objected to HOT theory on these grounds, citing our constant awareness of our own consciousness, which they claim cannot be explained by appeal to an...