Neuron
May 15, 2024
Johan F. Storm, P Christiaan Klink, Jaan Aru et al.
108 citations
Consciousness may be explained by multiple, partly compatible theories rather than a single winner. A group of scientists representing different theories argue that various accounts often address different aspects or mechanistic levels of conscious experience, so they do not necessarily contradict each other. Instead, several theories may converge on fundamental neuronal mechanisms and be complementary, allowing multiple perspectives to simultaneously advance understanding. The authors advocate for unifying, integration-oriented approaches that combine valuable elements from diverse theories, an approach that has so far been largely neglected.
PLoS One
December 4, 2025
Jonathan Robinson, Andrew W. Corcoran, Christopher J. Whyte et al.
1 citation
Active inference, a framework for modeling how sentient agents behave, is being tested as necessary for changes in conscious content. In an adversarial collaboration, active inference will be contrasted with two other theories that do not require it for consciousness. This study protocol describes an adaptation of the motion-induced blindness paradigm: an active condition where participants direct their gaze toward a target after it disappears from consciousness and report its reappearance, versus a passive condition where participants fixate centrally while the stimulus array moves in a replay of active eye-tracking data. Two experiments will compare target reappearance across conditions to evaluate active inference's contribution to conscious awareness.
Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews
August 1, 2026
Andrew W. Corcoran, Andrew M. Haun, Reinder Dorman et al.
Three theories of consciousness—Integrated Information Theory, Neurorepresentationalism, and Active Inference—are compared and contrasted in a structured adversarial collaboration. The review presents each theory's core claims, the phenomena they explain, their explanatory approaches, and methodological strategies. It outlines key hypotheses to be tested across multi-site experiments, discusses observations that would support or challenge each theory, and describes how data from disparate experiments can be formally integrated to quantify evidential support. The work also provides meta-scientific insights into the mechanics of adversarial collaboration and theory-testing, including how theories may be evaluated by the scientific progress they deliver.
Consciousness and Cognition
June 14, 2026
Cyriel M A Pennartz, Micha Engeser
Conscious experiences are not accidental byproducts but serve a specific biological function: they provide a multimodal, situational survey of the brain's environment (including the body) that enables deliberate, planned behaviors. This argument is grounded in a neurorepresentationalist position that rejects the separation of phenomenal consciousness from its neural substrate, treating them as one functional entity. The function is illustrated by perceptual phenomena such as seeing the world upright, multisensory integration, and spatial object constancy. Pathological cases like Anton and Bonnet syndrome, where misrepresentation of reality severely impairs behavior, further support this view. The position is contrasted with other proposals, particularly those emphasizing a learning function of consciousness.
PLoS One
January 1, 2026
Clement Abbatecola, Bernard Marius ’t Hart, Belén M. Montabes De la Cruz et al.
The subjective experience of space around the visual blind spot is investigated to test three theories of consciousness: Integrated Information Theory (IIT), Predictive Processing Active Inference (AI), and Predictive Processing Neurorepresentationalism (NREP). IIT predicts that the blind spot region, lacking feedforward input from one eye, should contribute differently to perceived spatial quality. The Predictive Processing accounts argue that internal models accommodate structural deviations based on sensory evidence. Participants evaluate distances, areas, and illusory motion with or without the blind spot involved. Psychometric models quantify bias and precision in perceived versus objective space. Simulated results correspond to each theory's predictions, and challenges for dissemination are discussed.
arXiv Preprint Archive
August 30, 2025
Andrew W. Corcoran, Andrew M. Haun, Reinder Dorman et al.
Three major theories of consciousness—Integrated Information Theory, Neurorepresentationalism, and Active Inference—are compared and contrasted in the context of a structured adversarial collaboration designed to test their competing predictions. The review presents each theory's core claims, the phenomena they explain, their explanatory styles, and methodological strategies. It outlines key hypotheses to be tested across multi-site experiments, discusses observations that would support or challenge each theory, and describes how data from disparate experiments can be formally integrated to provide a quantitative measure of evidential support. The work also offers meta-scientific insights into adversarial collaboration and theory-testing.
PLoS One
January 1, 2025
Kengo Takahashi, Samuel Pontes Quero, Julien Fiorilli et al.
A planned experiment will test two competing theories of consciousness: one holding that neuronal activity itself generates conscious experience, the other that the causal structure of neural circuits is responsible. The experiment will optogenetically inactivate a portion of mouse visual cortex that does not respond to behaviorally relevant stimuli, targeting neurons with very low spiking activity that does not significantly affect other cortical areas. The effect on perception of the spatial distribution of stimuli will be measured. Results will be compared against theoretical predictions to help determine the neuronal substrate of consciousness.
eNeuro
September 1, 2024
Simone Ciceri, Matthijs N Oude Lohuis, Vivi Rottschäfer et al.
Conscious report of visual input correlates with two distinct neural responses in the primary visual cortex (V1): an early response tied to stimulus features and a late response linked to report or detection. This late wave, central to theories of consciousness, was thought to be driven by the prefrontal cortex (PFC). Analyzing two electrophysiological studies in mice performing detection tasks, researchers characterized activity in V1, posterior parietal cortex (PPC), and PFC. A minimal network model constrained by known connectivity showed that while PFC is necessary to generate report-related activity in V1, it only does so through PPC mediation. PPC, not PFC, ultimately enables the late wave of V1 activity.
BMC Medical Ethics
March 27, 2022
Michele Farisco, Cyriel M A Pennartz, Jitka Annen et al.
A recently introduced list of operational indicators of consciousness, originally developed for challenging cases like non-human animals and artificial intelligence, may help address the high misdiagnosis rate among patients with disorders of consciousness. These indicators are particular capacities deduced from behavior, cognitive performance, or neural correlates, and they do not define a hard threshold for consciousness but allow graded inference based on consistency across indicators. Applying these indicators to disorders of consciousness could inspire new strategies for reducing misdiagnosis, establishing a gold standard for detecting consciousness, and refining the taxonomy of these disorders.
The Behavioral and brain sciences
March 23, 2022
Cyriel M A Pennartz
A critical analysis of panpsychism argues that while integrated information theory could in principle apply to simple systems like photodiodes and subatomic particles, the main obstacle is the complete lack of evidence confirming consciousness in such entities. The perspectivalist theory of consciousness further illustrates the challenges in developing a comprehensive theory of consciousness.
Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience
January 1, 2019
Cyriel M A Pennartz, Michele Farisco, Kathinka Evers
Consciousness likely evolved to provide animals with a multimodal, situational awareness of the world and body, supporting complex decision-making and goal-directed behavior. This review proposes six observable indicators—goal-directed behavior and model-based learning; brain substrates for integrative multimodal representations; psychometrics and metacognition; episodic memory; susceptibility to illusions and multistable perception; and specific visuospatial behaviors—that together can be used to assess consciousness in non-human animals and intelligent artifacts. Rather than a single hard threshold, consistency across these indicators yields a graded assessment, similar to the Glasgow Coma Scale. Current deep learning neural networks and agile robots show no indication of consciousness; assessing machine consciousness requires ethological, longitudinal study of flexible, improvisational behaviors.
The Journal of neuroscience : the official journal of the Society for Neuroscience
November 8, 2017
Johan F. Storm, Melanie Boly, Adenauer G. Casali et al.
The mind-body problem—how consciousness arises from brain processes—has long been considered a philosophical puzzle but is now being tackled empirically. This review describes progress since Crick and Koch (1998) proposed searching for the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). It covers content-specific NCCs, which link particular brain activity to specific experiences, and the full NCC, which supports entire conscious states. The authors discuss methodological advances for isolating conscious experience from enabling functions, suggest that reconsidering the frontal cortex's role may refine NCCs, advocate for objective brain-based measures of consciousness independent of sensory or executive processes, and show how animal studies reveal network phenomena relevant to consciousness mechanisms.