Perspectives on psychological science : a journal of the Association for Psychological Science
January 1, 2025
Andrew W. Corcoran, Kelsey Perrykkad, Daniel Feuerriegel et al.
19 citations
Predictive processing theories, especially active inference, have been proposed as a way to reconcile embodied and traditional cognitive science. This analysis argues that most active-inference accounts rely on weak or trivial conceptions of embodiment, while stronger claims do not follow from the framework itself. A more compelling version of embodied active inference is motivated by taking a diachronic view of how rhythmic physiological activity shapes neural development before birth. The visceral afferent training hypothesis proposes that early-emerging physiological processes, particularly from the cardiovascular system, are essential for configuring cognitive architecture. Three candidate mechanisms are suggested: activity-dependent neuronal development, periodic signal modeling, and oscillatory network coordination.
Physics of Life Reviews
March 1, 2026
Christopher J. Whyte, Andrew W. Corcoran, Jonathan Robinson et al.
5 citations
Subjective experience is multifaceted, making it hard for traditional neuroscientific theories of consciousness to be compared because each focuses on different aspects like perceptual awareness or global states. This work instead starts from active inference, a first-principles framework that models behavior as approximate Bayesian inference, and builds a minimal theory of consciousness from shared features of computational models derived under active inference. By reviewing studies that apply active inference models to consciousness, the authors identify a small set of theoretical commitments implicit in these models, pointing toward a minimal and testable theory of consciousness.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
June 11, 2025
Manuela Kirberg, Jonathan Robinson, Jennifer Windt
3 citations
Spontaneous thoughts and experiences like dreaming and mind wandering share many features but also differ in important ways. This study compared 340 questionnaire responses about dreaming and waking mind wandering, using a self-caught design to capture spontaneous experiences in daily life. Mixed-effect binary logistic regression identified dimensions that significantly predicted either dreaming or mind wandering, revealing differences between the two states. Visual and immersive imagery and scene-organization were central to dream phenomenology. Results showed a complex picture of similarities and differences, suggesting that dreaming may be intensified along certain dimensions compared to mind wandering.
PLoS One
December 4, 2025
Jonathan Robinson, Andrew W. Corcoran, Christopher J. Whyte et al.
1 citation
Active inference, a framework for modeling how sentient agents behave, is being tested as necessary for changes in conscious content. In an adversarial collaboration, active inference will be contrasted with two other theories that do not require it for consciousness. This study protocol describes an adaptation of the motion-induced blindness paradigm: an active condition where participants direct their gaze toward a target after it disappears from consciousness and report its reappearance, versus a passive condition where participants fixate centrally while the stimulus array moves in a replay of active eye-tracking data. Two experiments will compare target reappearance across conditions to evaluate active inference's contribution to conscious awareness.
Scientific Reports
November 12, 2024
András Sárközy, Jonathan Robinson, Gyula Kovács
Motion-induced blindness (MIB) is an illusion where a peripheral target disappears from awareness when viewed against a moving background. This study measured how long a target remained visible at eight positions around the visual field. Disappearance times and frequencies varied significantly with target location: targets on the cardinal axes (horizontal and vertical) vanished less often and for shorter periods than those on oblique axes, and targets on the horizontal meridian vanished less than those on the vertical. These polar angle asymmetries in MIB suggest that conscious visual perception is not uniform across the visual field, with specific consistencies between visual field location and the timing of perceptual disappearances.
arXiv Preprint Archive
October 9, 2024
Christopher J. Whyte, Andrew W. Corcoran, Jonathan Robinson et al.
Subjective experience is multifaceted, making consciousness hard to study because traditional theories often focus on isolated aspects like perception or wakefulness and are difficult to compare. This work starts from active inference—a first-principles framework that models behavior as approximate Bayesian inference—and builds toward a minimal theory of consciousness derived from shared features of computational models under active inference. Reviewing models applied to consciousness, the authors argue that these models imply a small set of theoretical commitments pointing to a minimal, testable theory of consciousness.