Artificial consciousness: a perspective from the free energy principle

The assumption that the right form of neural computation is sufficient for consciousness does not automatically mean that a digital simulation of those computations is conscious. From the perspective of Karl Friston's free energy principle, self-organising systems like living organisms have properties that are not present in classical von Neumann computer architectures. One such property—a specific kind of causal flow—can distinguish systems that merely simulate consciousness from those that actually replicate it.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Does the assumption of a weak form of computational functionalism, according to which the right form of neural computation is sufficient for consciousness, entail that a digital computational simulation of such neural computations is conscious? Or must this computational simulation be implemented in the right way, in order to replicate consciousness? From the perspective of Karl Friston’s free energy principle, self-organising systems (such as living organisms) share a set of properties that could be realised in artificial systems, but are not instantiated by computers with a classical (von Neumann) architecture. I argue that at least one of these properties, viz. a certain kind of causal flow, can be used to draw a distinction between systems that merely simulate, and those that actually replicate consciousness.