Overcoming the Past-endorsement Criterion: Toward a Transparency-Based Mark of the Mental.
Giulia Piredda, Michele Di Francesco
Frontiers in Psychology January 1, 2020 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01278 (opens in new tab) via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractA weak conscientialist mark of the mental based on transparent access can prevent the overextension of the mind (cognitive bloat) without identifying the mental with the conscious. This proposal connects the evaluation of criteria for extending the mind to the search for a mark of the mental, building on Clark and Chalmers' original criteria and earlier work by the authors. The concept of transparency vindicates consciousness's role in defining what is mental while avoiding the problem of cognitive bloat.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Cognitive bloat Consciousness Extended mind Past-endorsement criterion Transparency |
| Key finding | Argues that a "weak conscientialist" mark of the mental based on transparent access can help evaluate criteria for extended cognition without overextending the mind. |
Abstract
Starting from the discussion on the original set of criteria advanced by Clark and Chalmers (1998) meant to avoid the overextension of the mind, or the so-called cognitive bloat, we will sketch our solution to the problem of criteria evaluation, by connecting it to the search for a mark of the mental. Our proposal is to argue for a "weak conscientialist" mark of the mental based on transparent access, which vindicates the role of consciousness in defining what is mental without, however, identifying the mental with the conscious. This renovated link between mind and consciousness, spelled out through the concept of transparency, further develops some of our previous work on the topic (Di Francesco, 2007; Di Francesco and Piredda, 2012) and is partially inspired by Horgan and Kriegel (2008).