Analogies, Non-reductionism and Illusions
Michele Di Francesco, Alfredo Tomasetta
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia December 1, 2015 DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2015.0046 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Commentary Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Nannini overstates the success of cognitive neuroscience, that non-reductionism is not necessarily a Cartesian position, and that neurocognitive data do not show or even suggest that consciousness, free will, and the Self are illusory. |
Abstract
This commentary focuses on three aspects of Sandro Nannini's paper Time and Consciusness in Cognitive Naturalism: (1) the parallel between Einstein's theory of relativity and the new science of the mind/brain; (2) the Cartesian characterization of non-reductionist positions in the philosophy of mind;(3) the alleged illusory status of consciousness, free will and the Self.We suggest, first, that Nannini overstates the success of cognitive neuroscience; second, that non-reductionism is not necessarily a Cartesian position; and third, that the neurocognitive science data do not show or even suggest, that consciousness, free will and the Self are illusory phenomena.