A weak conscientialist mark of the mental based on transparent access can prevent the overextension of the mind (cognitive bloat) without identifying the mental with the conscious. This proposal connects the evaluation of criteria for extending the mind to the search for a mark of the mental, building on Clark and Chalmers' original criteria and earlier work by the authors. The concept of transparency vindicates consciousness's role in defining what is mental while avoiding the problem of cognitive bloat.
The extended mind hypothesis holds that some mental states can be realized by non-biological external resources. Two main criticisms—the coupling-constitution fallacy and the alleged lack of a mark of the cognitive—have been raised against this view. This paper argues that neither criticism is effective. The mark of the cognitive proposed by critics does not secure the position that cognition is always intracranial, and the coupling-constitution fallacy attacks extended cognition on the very point the theory was designed to defend: that coupling relations between agents and environmental resources are the best way to individuate cognitive systems.
The extended mind hypothesis portrays humans as natural-born cyborgs whose minds are enlarged through the integrated use of technological and environmental resources. This paper outlines the historical background of the model, starting with criticisms of classical cognitive science and methodological individualism. It presents and discusses the main philosophical argument for extended mind, based on the plausibility of extended dispositional belief. Problematic aspects are considered, including the problem of criteria, the causal-constitution fallacy, and the mark of the cognitive. The conclusion is that, despite several theoretical difficulties, the model's main advantage is proposing a vision of the human mind in which biology, culture, and technology are integrated.