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Philosophy of mind: all studies

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Research

Being a Beast Machine: The Somatic Basis of Selfhood.

Trends in Cognitive Sciences November 2018 Anil K. Seth, Manos Tsakiris

Modern psychology has long focused on the body as the basis of the self. Recently, predictive processing accounts of interoception (perception of the body 'from within') have become influential in accounting for experiences of body ownership and emotion. Here, we describe embodied selfhood in terms of 'instrumental interoceptive inference' that emphasises allostatic regulation and physiological...

"Yes It Is Phenomenological": A Reply to Max Van Manen's Critique of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis.

Qualitative Health Research October 1, 2018 Jonathan A Smith

In this article, I present a rebuttal of Max Van Manen's critique of interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA). Unfortunately, Van Manen's piece contains a series of misrepresentations of IPA and its history. Here, I answer these misrepresentations and present IPA as subscribing, and contributing, to a broad and holistic phenomenology concerned with both prereflective and reflective...

Musical hallucinations, musical imagery, and earworms: A new phenomenological survey.

Consciousness and Cognition October 2018 Peter Moseley, Ben Alderson-Day, Sukhbinder Kumar et al.

Musical hallucinations (MH) account for a significant proportion of auditory hallucinations, but there is a relative lack of research into their phenomenology. In contrast, much research has focused on other forms of internally generated musical experience, such as earworms (involuntary and repetitive inner music), showing that they can vary in perceived control, repetitiveness, and in their...

The feeling of effort during mental activity.

Consciousness and Cognition August 2018 Erik Bijleveld

The feeling of effort is familiar to most, if not all, humans. Prior research shows that the feeling of effort shapes judgments (e.g., of agency) and decisions (e.g., to quit the current task) in various ways, but the proximal causes of the feeling of effort are not well understood. In this research, I address these proximal causes. In particular, I conducted two preregistered experiments in...

A free will needs a free mind: Belief in substance dualism and reductive physicalism differentially predict belief in free will and determinism.

Consciousness and Cognition August 1, 2018 Matthias Forstmann, Pascal Burgmer

In this article, we show that lay people's beliefs about how minds relate to bodies are more complex than past research suggests, and that treating them as a multidimensional construct helps explain inconclusive findings from the literature regarding their relation to beliefs about whether humans possess a free will. In two studies, we found that items previously used to assess a unidimensional...

Comparative psychology without consciousness.

Consciousness and Cognition August 1, 2018 Peter Carruthers 37 citations

The goal of this paper is to establish the truth of the following conditional: if a global workspace theory of phenomenal consciousness is correct, and is fully reductive in nature, then we should stop asking questions about consciousness in nonhuman animals-not because those questions are too hard to answer, but because there are no substantive facts to discover. The argument in support of...

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2018.06.012 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Hard problem Access consciousness Animal consciousness Degrees of consciousness +2

The mind-body problem.

Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science July 1, 2018 Bryan Chambliss

The mind-body problem is the problem of explaining how the happenings of our mental lives are related to physical states, events and processes. Proposed solutions to the problem vary by whether and how they endorse physicalism, the claim that mental states are ultimately "nothing over and above" physical states, and by how they understand the interactions between mental and physical states....

A cat is not a battleship: thoughts on the meaning of "neuropsychoanalysis".

The International Journal of Psychoanalysis April 2018 Brett H Clarke

As a conspicuously hybrid entity, neuropsychoanalysis enjoins one to look critically at its assumptions about knowledge and subjectivity as one tries to understand how its un-hyphenated halves relate to one another. The author looks at the differences between mind (which is grounded in subjective experience) and brain (which is an objectively described neurobiological entity), and suggests that...

Multiple Realities and Hybrid Objects: A Creative Approach of Schizophrenic Delusion.

Frontiers in Psychology February 13, 2018 Michel Cermolacce, Katherine Despax, Raphaëlle Richieri et al.

Delusion is usually considered in DSM 5 as a false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality, but the issue of delusion raises crucial concerns, especially that of a possible (or absent) continuity between delusional and normal experiences, and the understanding of delusional experience. In the present study, we first aim to consider delusion from a perspectivist angle,...

Neuroscience and everyday life: Facing the translation problem.

Brain and Cognition February 2018 Jolien C. Francken, Marc Slors

To enable the impact of neuroscientific insights on our daily lives, careful translation of research findings is required. However, neuroscientific terminology and common-sense concepts are often hard to square. For example, when neuroscientists study lying to allow the use of brain scans for lie-detection purposes, the concept of lying in the scientific case differs considerably from the...