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Comparative psychology without consciousness.

Peter Carruthers

Consciousness and Cognition August 1, 2018 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2018.06.012 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Access consciousness Animal consciousness Degrees of consciousness Global workspace Phenomenal consciousness
Citations 37
Key points Argues that if a fully reductive global workspace theory of phenomenal consciousness is correct, then questions about consciousness in nonhuman animals have no substantive facts to discover.

Abstract

The goal of this paper is to establish the truth of the following conditional: if a global workspace theory of phenomenal consciousness is correct, and is fully reductive in nature, then we should stop asking questions about consciousness in nonhuman animals-not because those questions are too hard to answer, but because there are no substantive facts to discover. The argument in support of this conditional turns on the idea that while global broadcasting is all-or-nothing in the human mind, it is framed in terms that imply gradations across species. Yet our concept of phenomenal consciousness doesn't permit mental states to be to some degree conscious. Before getting to that argument, however, and in order to motivate the subsequent discussion, some of the virtues of global workspace theory are displayed.

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