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Being a Beast Machine: The Somatic Basis of Selfhood.

Anil K. Seth, Manos Tsakiris

Trends in Cognitive Sciences November 2018 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2018.08.008 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Allostasis Embodied selfhood Free energy principle Interoception Predictive processing
Key points Argues that embodied selfhood can be described as 'instrumental interoceptive inference' emphasizing allostatic regulation and physiological integrity, and that this predictive processing account explains the non-object-like character and subjective stability of embodied selfhood. Contends, contrary to Descartes, that experiences of embodied selfhood arise because of, not in spite of, our nature as 'beast machines'.

Abstract

Modern psychology has long focused on the body as the basis of the self. Recently, predictive processing accounts of interoception (perception of the body 'from within') have become influential in accounting for experiences of body ownership and emotion. Here, we describe embodied selfhood in terms of 'instrumental interoceptive inference' that emphasises allostatic regulation and physiological integrity. We apply this approach to the distinctive phenomenology of embodied selfhood, accounting for its non-object-like character and subjective stability over time. Our perspective has implications for the development of selfhood and illuminates longstanding debates about relations between life and mind, implying, contrary to Descartes, that experiences of embodied selfhood arise because of, and not in spite of, our nature as 'beast machines'.

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