Abstract I argue that we are not epistemically justified to judge whether the neurobiological details of computational mechanisms are relevant to consciousness or not. It is unclear how the medium independence of neural computation required for Computational Functionalism could be established. But it is also unclear whether predictive processing depends on life-sustaining biological processes...
Abstract Seth’s argument relies on the unargued-for claim that if computational functionalism is false, conscious AI is impossible. I show why the claim is in need of support by way of an analogy. I use a different analogy, involving artificial flight, to show that even if human consciousness is ineliminably biological, this does not imply the impossibility of non-biological, computational AI.
Abstract The target article draws a sharp contrast between intelligence and consciousness. We believe this contrast is premature and rests on an overly narrow characterisation of intelligence as abilities that can be exhaustively characterised as mappings from sensory inputs to behavioural outputs. Instead, we argue that the fortunes of intelligence and consciousness are interwoven more tightly...
Abstract Seth argues in favour of strongly substrate-dependent biological naturalism. I suggest we need more reason to believe the substrates in question are consciousness-specific. Instead, the case for mortal computational biological naturalism is more promising. A self-evidencing framing helps elucidate what the consciousness-specific functional characteristics of mortal computation might...
Abstract Seth argues that anthropocentrism, anthropomorphism, and human exceptionalism bias us towards an overly optimistic view of the prospects of conscious AI. I agree, but argue that these phenomena might also bias us towards an overly pessimistic view of the prospects for artificial consciousness. Furthermore, it is not always clear when these factors are functioning as “biases.”
Abstract Digital computation may not be sufficient for consciousness, but this does not warrant biological naturalism. Rejecting coarse-grained Turing-computational functionalism and adopting a broader computationalism with no built-in syntax/semantics distinction, undermines the motivation for biological naturalism. Substrate-dependent processes of the kind found in living things may be...
Abstract Seth’s case for biological naturalism rests on a worryingly speculative foundation: the free energy principle. Arguments for computational functionalism are likewise speculative. Yet I am optimistic that the clash can be resolved empirically. Alleged dependencies of consciousness markers on biological properties can be tested comparatively, and a pattern of failed predictions would...
Abstract Seth mounts a rich and persuasive case that human consciousness cannot be understood without life’s distinctive machinery – autopoiesis, allostatic control, predictive processing under the free-energy principle, and substrate-entangled dynamics. I agree that this undercuts the expectation that humanlike consciousness will “come for free” with more intelligent machines. However, we...
Abstract Living things are special because they are valuing subjects, for whom things can be good or bad. This is in virtue of their having internalized optimization processes, tied to persistence, that evaluate whether things are going well or poorly and adjust appropriately. Those evaluations, when integrated from diverse sources and widely available, provide the basis for conscious experience.
Abstract Is efficient intelligence enough to produce consciousness, or do we need a system to be in some way “alive” in order for it to be conscious? While I don’t know the answer, I suspect the former is likely to be closer to the mark.
Abstract To be conscious is to be an experiencing subject. This can be defined not in terms of computational functions or particular biological substrates, but rather in terms of relations: between subject and world, between parts of the subject, and through time. These kinds of relations – comprising a conscious mode of being – may well be implementable in artificial systems.
Our target article proposed that vertebrates, cephalopod mollusks, and euarthropods independently converged onto high levels of brain and cognitive complexity and that this macroevolutionary trend was coupled with and facilitated by the acquisition of a small set of pivotal traits, used in visuomotor control of three-dimensional and targeted movements. In response to commentaries that...
The cerebral neocortex is essential for the complex feature extractions underlying sensory perception. Pain is an exception. Its adaptive message, fight or flee, is already available at the first central synapse. We propose that raw consciousness emerged with pain. Eons later the cortical supercomputer began providing complex computational output to the primeval circuitry of conscious pain...
The scope of unconscious processing has long been, and still remains, a hotly debated issue. This is driven in part by the current diversity of methods to manipulate and measure perceptual consciousness. Here, we provide ten recommendations and nine outstanding issues about designing experimental paradigms, analyzing data, and reporting the results of studies on unconscious processing. These...
Human societies reliably develop complex cultural traditions with striking similarities. These "super-attractors" span the domains of magic and religion (e.g., shamanism, supernatural punishment beliefs), aesthetics (e.g., heroic tales, dance songs), and social institutions (e.g., justice, corporate groups), and collectively constitute what I call the "cultural manifold." The cultural manifold...
It is not obvious why we are conscious. Why can't all of our mental activities take place unconsciously? What is consciousness for? We aim to make progress on this question, focusing on conscious vision. We review evidence on the timescale of visual consciousness, showing that it is surprisingly slow: postdictive effects reveal windows of unconscious integration lasting up to 400 milliseconds....
As artificial intelligence (AI) continues to advance, it is natural to ask whether AI systems can be not only intelligent, but also conscious. I consider why people might think AI could develop consciousness, identifying some biases that lead us astray. I ask what it would take for conscious AI to be a realistic prospect, challenging the assumption that computation provides a sufficient basis...
Abstract: Vision is inseparably connected to perceptual awareness which can be seen as the culmination of sensory processing. Studies on conscious vision reveal that object recognition is just one of the means through which our representation of the world is built. We propose an operationalization of subjective experience in the context of deep neural networks (DNNs) that could encourage a more...
Abstract: Barzykowski and Moulin argue that common memory processes form the basis of involuntary autobiographical memory and the déjà vu experience. We think that they underemphasize the potential dissociability between processes that enact retrieval and the processes that produce conscious experience. We propose that retrieval and conscious experience result from different processes in both...
We agree with Bruineberg and colleagues' main claims. However, we urge for a more forceful critique by focusing on the extended mind debate. We argue that even once the Pearl and Friston versions of the Markov blanket have been untangled, that neither is sufficient for tackling and resolving the question of demarcating the boundaries of the mind.
Integrated information theory (IIT) is an example of "ironic science" and obstructs the scientific study of consciousness. By confusing the ontological status of a method to quantify network complexity with that of a theory of consciousness, IIT has to square the circle and spirals toward its panpsychism conclusion. I analyze the consequences of this fallacy and suggest how the study of...
Merker, Williford, and Rudrauf make several arguments against the integrated information theory of consciousness; whereas some have merit, their conclusion that the theory should be discarded is premature. Coming years promise advances in the empirical study of consciousness, and only after theories are independently tested with shared data can they be ruled in or out. We propose future...
We propose that measures of information integration can be more straightforwardly interpreted as measures of agency rather than of consciousness. This may be useful to the goals of consciousness research, given how agency and consciousness are "duals" in many (although not all) respects.
The idea that consciousness and complexity are closely related has been a major driver of the popularity of integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness, despite its major formal, phenomenological, and neuroscientific shortcomings. Here, I argue that we can recover this intuition by replacing its biologically neutral notion of complexity with an evolutionary one that I shall dub...
The integrated information theory (IIT) equates levels of consciousness with the amount of information integrated over the elements that constitute a system. Conscious visual perception provides two observations that contradict the IIT. First, objects are accurately perceived when presented for ≪100 ms during which time no neural integration is possible. Second, an object is seen as an...