Birds do it, we do it, even embodied machines could do it. Why consciousness is not intrinsically biological.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2026 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x25103737 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that rejecting coarse-grained Turing-computational functionalism in favor of a broader computationalism without a built-in syntax/semantics distinction undermines the motivation for biological naturalism. Substrate-dependent processes in living things may be necessary for consciousness, but the author contends these are functional requirements, not intrinsic properties. |
Abstract
Abstract Digital computation may not be sufficient for consciousness, but this does not warrant biological naturalism. Rejecting coarse-grained Turing-computational functionalism and adopting a broader computationalism with no built-in syntax/semantics distinction, undermines the motivation for biological naturalism. Substrate-dependent processes of the kind found in living things may be necessary for the emergence of consciousness, but these are functional requirements, not intrinsic properties.