Consciousness needs a subject
Kevin J. Mitchell, Carolyn Dicey Jennings
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2026 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x25103452 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that consciousness is best defined by relations—between subject and world, among parts of the subject, and through time—rather than by computational functions or biological substrates, and proposes that this relational 'conscious mode of being' may be implementable in artificial systems. |
Abstract
Abstract To be conscious is to be an experiencing subject. This can be defined not in terms of computational functions or particular biological substrates, but rather in terms of relations: between subject and world, between parts of the subject, and through time. These kinds of relations – comprising a conscious mode of being – may well be implementable in artificial systems.