Anatomical, physiological, and psychophysical data show that the nature of conscious perception is incompatible with the integrated information theory (IIT).
The Behavioral and brain sciences March 23, 2022 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x21001989 (opens in new tab) via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractIntegrated information theory (IIT) equates consciousness with the amount of integrated information in a system, but conscious visual perception presents two counterexamples. First, objects are accurately perceived when presented for less than 100 milliseconds, a duration too brief for neural integration. Second, an object is seen as an integrated whole while its constituent details remain evident. Because integration destroys information about details, IIT cannot explain how perceptual details are preserved.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that two observations from conscious visual perception contradict the integrated information theory's account of consciousness. |
Abstract
The integrated information theory (IIT) equates levels of consciousness with the amount of information integrated over the elements that constitute a system. Conscious visual perception provides two observations that contradict the IIT. First, objects are accurately perceived when presented for ≪100 ms during which time no neural integration is possible. Second, an object is seen as an integrated whole and, concurrently, all constituent elements are evident. Because integration destroys information about details, IIT cannot account for perceptual detail preservation.