Free energy, consciousness, and the inverse dark room problem
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2026 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x25103713 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that both biological naturalism, as defended by Seth, and computational functionalism rest on speculative foundations, but proposes that comparative tests of whether consciousness markers depend on biological properties could empirically resolve the debate, with failed predictions favoring computational functionalism. |
Abstract
Abstract Seth’s case for biological naturalism rests on a worryingly speculative foundation: the free energy principle. Arguments for computational functionalism are likewise speculative. Yet I am optimistic that the clash can be resolved empirically. Alleged dependencies of consciousness markers on biological properties can be tested comparatively, and a pattern of failed predictions would tilt the odds towards computational functionalism.