Conscious Animals and the Value of Experience
Lori Gruen
Oxford Handbooks Online April 7, 2016 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199941339.013.9 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that consciousness and the capacity for interests ground the moral standing of sentient beings, and that ethical engagement with animals should extend beyond concern for suffering to respect for what constitutes well-being for them by their own lights. Notes that disagreement over which interests matter shapes judgments about permissible treatment of animals. |
Abstract
Consciousness, understood as an awareness of what is going on that helps shape one’s experiences, is one of the ways that scholars have distinguished animal life from the rest of the natural world. Beings that have interests in having good experiences and avoiding bad ones deserve our moral attention, and this quality is an important feature of ethical engagement with other sentient beings, both human and nonhuman. What interests matter and why they matter is a subject of disagreement that has affected what we judge to be permissible or impermissible treatment of other animals. Empathy toward and respect for other animals takes us beyond attention to their suffering and has us focus on what counts as well-being for others, by their own lights.