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Phenomenology and German Idealism

Alexander Schnell

Oxford Handbooks Online July 10, 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198755340.013.4 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenological projects share a speculative unity, and that grasping phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy requires recourse to German idealism. Proposes that the epistemological and ontological strands of phenomenology can be understood as one project when "metaphysical" conclusions are drawn from phenomenological analyses.

Abstract

The thesis of this chapter consists in putting forward the idea that, from the point of view of their speculative foundation, the works of the founding fathers of phenomenology (Husserl and Heidegger) admit of a unity, the nature of which is clarified by certain crucial contributions from German idealism. The perspective that the author is concerned to develop consists in attempting to show that, if phenomenology is understood as a transcendental philosophy, then to grasp its meaning, recourse to German idealism is unavoidable. To this end, the author examines the two “fundamental bases,” which amount to an epistemological and an ontological perspective; and he sketches how, from a perspective that draws “metaphysical” conclusions from these phenomenological analyses, these two parts can be understood as belonging to a single project. The essential objective will thus consist in showing how the concept of the transcendental in phenomenology relies on classical transcendental idealisms.

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