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Mapping Husserlian phenomenology onto active inference

Mahault Albarracin, R. J. Pitliya, Maxwell J D Ramstead, J. Yoshimi

International Workshop on Affective Interactions August 18, 2022 preprint DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2208.09058 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Proposes that key aspects of Husserl's descriptions of consciousness, particularly time consciousness, can be mapped onto aspects of the generative models used in active inference, advancing the project of computational phenomenology.

Abstract

Phenomenology is the rigorous descriptive study of conscious experience. Recent attempts to formalize Husserlian phenomenology provide us with a mathematical model of perception as a function of prior knowledge and expectation. In this paper, we re-examine elements of Husserlian phenomenology through the lens of active inference. In doing so, we aim to advance the project of computational phenomenology, as recently outlined by proponents of active inference. We propose that key aspects of Husserl's descriptions of consciousness can be mapped onto aspects of the generative models associated with the active inference approach. We first briefly review active inference. We then discuss Husserl's phenomenology, with a focus on time consciousness. Finally, we present our mapping from Husserlian phenomenology to active inference.

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