Synthese
June 1, 2025
Paul R. Smart, Robert W. Clowes, A. Clark
Recent research has relied on the use of fine-tuning techniques to incorporate philosophical knowledge into Large Language Models (LLMs). The present paper outlines an alternative approach to the development of such systems—one that is rooted in a technique known as Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG). In contrast to fine-tuning, RAG does not seek to adjust the internal parameters (or internal...
Synthese
August 1, 2022
Paul R. Smart, Gloria Andrada, Robert W. Clowes
Proponents of the extended mind have suggested that phenomenal transparency may be important to the way we evaluate putative cases of cognitive extension. In particular, it has been suggested that in order for a bio-external resource to count as part of the machinery of the mind, it must qualify as a form of transparent equipment or transparent technology. The present paper challenges this...
Frontiers in Psychology
2018
Marcin Miłkowski, Robert W. Clowes, Zuzanna Rucińska et al.
82 citations
In this paper, we argue that several recent 'wide' perspectives on cognition (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive, and distributed) are only partially relevant to the study of cognition. While these wide accounts override traditional methodological individualism, the study of cognition has already progressed beyond these proposed perspectives toward building integrated explanations of the...
Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science
April 1, 2017
Klaus Gärtner, Robert W. Clowes
8 citations
Abstract According to Enactivism, cognition should be understood in terms of a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment. Further, this view holds that organisms do not passively receive information from this environment, they rather selectively create this environment by engaging in interaction with the world. Radical Enactivism adds that basic cognition does so...
Artificial intelligence in medicine
October 1, 2008
Robert W. Clowes, Anil K. Seth
Synthetic methods in science can aim at either instantiating a target phenomenon or simulating key mechanisms underlying that phenomenon; 'strong' and 'weak' approaches, respectively. While the former assumes a mature theory, the latter find its value in helping specify such theories. Here, we argue that artificial consciousness is best pursued as a (weak) means of theory development in...