Several recent 'wide' perspectives on cognition—embodied, embedded, extended, enactive, and distributed—are only partially relevant because cognitive science has already moved beyond them toward integrated mechanistic explanations that include internal submechanisms, interactions with others, groups, cognitive artifacts, and the environment. These wide perspectives function as research heuristics for building such explanations. The argument draws on developments in the study of mindreading and debates on emotions, showing that cognitive neuroscience has undergone a silent mechanistic revolution, turning from binary oppositions toward integration with the broader field.
Radical Enactivism claims that basic cognition does not involve mental representations, presenting itself as a revolutionary alternative to standard cognitive science. Some proponents argue this radicalization should extend to predictive processing, another influential approach to cognition. This paper argues that radicalizing predictive processing adds no value to that framework. It further analyzes whether Radical Enactivism itself constitutes a revolution within cognitive science and concludes it does not. The authors ultimately advocate for cognitive science to embrace heterogeneity rather than pursuing a single revolutionary framework.
Some philosophers argue that for an external tool to count as part of the mind, it must be used so automatically that it becomes phenomenally transparent—like a blind person's cane that is felt as an extension of the body. This paper challenges that claim, arguing that phenomenal transparency is neither necessary nor sufficient for cognitive extension. Instead, transparency is a feature of situations that lead us to ascribe mental dispositions to ourselves and others. The authors clarify the role of transparency in debates about the extended mind, showing it is relevant to understanding when extended cognition occurs but not a decisive criterion.
Synthetic methods in science can aim to either instantiate a target phenomenon (strong approach) or simulate key mechanisms underlying it (weak approach). The strong approach assumes a mature theory, while the weak approach helps develop such theories. The authors argue that artificial consciousness is best pursued as a weak means of theory development in consciousness science, not as a strong axiom-driven project to build a conscious artifact. Like other sciences of the artificial, artificial consciousness can elaborate possibilities and limitations of candidate mechanisms, transform properties into mechanism-based criteria, and potentially unify distinct properties via new mechanism-based concepts. The arguments are illustrated by discussing both axiom-driven and neurobiologically grounded approaches to artificial consciousness.