Frontiers in Psychology
May 4, 2022
Zuzanna Rucińska, Thomas Fondelli
11 citations
What makes metaphors good therapeutic tools? In this paper, we provide an answer to this question by analyzing how metaphors work in systemic collaborative therapeutic practices. We look at the recent embodied, enactive and ecological proposals to metaphors, and provide our own, dialogical-enactive account, whereby metaphors are tools for enacting change in therapeutic dialogs. We highlight the...
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
2022
Martin Weichold, Zuzanna Rucińska
3 citations
In his recent paper "Getting Real About Pretense: A Radical Enactivist Proposal", Daniel Hutto raises several objections against our so-called praxeological enactivist account of pretense (Weichold & Rucińska 2022). He argues that one should, instead, adopt his radical enactivist explanation of pretend play. In this short reply, we defend our praxeological enactivist account against his...
Healthcare (Basel, Switzerland)
February 13, 2021
Zuzanna Rucińska, Thomas Fondelli, Shaun Gallagher
11 citations
This paper discusses different frameworks for understanding imagination and metaphor in the context of research on the imaginative skills of children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). In contrast to a standard linguistic framework, it advances an embodied and enactive account of imagination and metaphor. The paper describes a case study from a systemic therapeutic session with a child with...
Frontiers in Psychology
2018
Marcin Miłkowski, Robert W. Clowes, Zuzanna Rucińska et al.
82 citations
In this paper, we argue that several recent 'wide' perspectives on cognition (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive, and distributed) are only partially relevant to the study of cognition. While these wide accounts override traditional methodological individualism, the study of cognition has already progressed beyond these proposed perspectives toward building integrated explanations of the...
Frontiers in Psychology
2015
Zuzanna Rucińska, Ellen Reijmers
19 citations
This paper informs therapeutic practices that use play, by providing a non-standard philosophical account of pretense: the enactive account of pretend play (EAPP). The EAPP holds that pretend play activity need not invoke mental representational mechanisms; instead, it focuses on interaction and the role of affordances in shaping pretend play activity. One advantage of this re-characterization...