The Who and the How of Experience
Oxford University Press eBooks December 1, 2010 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593804.003.0002 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 16 |
| Key points | Argues that the sense of self arising from consciousness does not entail the existence of a real, stable self. Proposes that phenomenal character, as captured by the minimal self-model, can exist without a permanent or unconditioned self, drawing on Buddhist conceptions of selfless subjectivity. |
Abstract
This chapter argues for the counter-intuitive thesis that consciousness does not require a self. Granted, a central feature of conscious states is that their mode of appearance exhibits an irreducibly first-personal nature, and this ‘how’ of consciousness is what secures its phenomenal character. It seems natural to assume that this ‘how’ points back to a ‘who’. This chapter argues, however, that just because the subjective character of consciousness gives rise to a sense of self—that is, the felt sense of being a stable who, or owner of conscious episodes—it does not follow that this who really exists. It examines the notion of a ‘minimal self’ developed by Zahavi and others, as well as a Buddhist conception of selfless subjectivity, and then argues that the phenomenal character of consciousness, which the minimal self-model is supposed to capture, does not require the existence of a stable, permanent, or unconditioned self.