If we consider the kinds of intelligence generated by brain-body-environment systems, then such emergent minds may be vaster still in terms of their complex combinatorics, with the pinnacle of expressive power potentially being found in language with its “infinite use of finite means”. The field of artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) seeks to reproduce the powers of biological...
October 4, 2023Inês Hipólito, Sofia Tzima2 citations
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This paper argues that cultural embodiment plays a pivotal factor in shaping psychological experiences, influencing both the development and treatment of mental health conditions. Traditional analytic philosophy of mind proposes that the efficacy of psychedelic-assisted therapy should be understood as a brain computational model update. Beyond the scientific understanding of neural activity, we...
Abstract We propose a non-representationalist framework for deep learning relying on a novel method computational phenomenology, a dialogue between the first-person perspective (relying on phenomenology) and the mechanisms of computational models. We thereby propose an alternative to the modern cognitivist interpretation of deep learning, according to which artificial neural networks encode...
Abstract Philosophy of science has undergone a naturalistic turn, moving away from traditional idealized concerns with the logical structure of scientific theories and toward focusing on real-world scientific practice, especially in domains such as modeling and experimentation. As part of this shift, recent work has explored how the project of philosophically understanding science as a natural...
Radically enactive accounts of perceiving directly and diametrically oppose their representationalist rivals. This is true even of the most radical predictive processing theories of perception which embrace some enactivist assumptions yet retain some commitment to representationalism. Which framework should we prefer? This chapter seeks to make headway on this question by focusing on the...
This paper defends that from macroscale human computation, it does not follow that microscale processes involve ontological properties of macroscale computation. Section 1 critically assesses and rejects computational realism, i.e. that computational models have an independent reality. Section 2 expounds that even on a deflated computational realism of mind-machine metaphor shaping scientific...
April 11, 2023Regine Rørstad Torbjørnsen, Inês Hipólito3 citations
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Online audiovisual interaction (AVOI), though minimal, constitutes a form of embodiment. This implies that empathy can be fostered even in non-co-located individuals through online platforms. To address both the limitations and potential of online embodied interaction the article develops a framework for comprehending and cultivating empathy in the virtual realm. It argues that empathy is a...
March 17, 2023Inês Hipólito, Paul van Geert, Luiz Pessoa2 citations
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This paper explores the brain-behavior relationship, integrating embodiment, enactment, and dynamical processes. The classical dynamical hypothesis offers a mathematical framework for describing state space trajectories. These abstract processes benefit from understanding systems as embodied and enactive – what we shall call the Complexity Hypothesis. Reconciling dynamics and embodiment remains...
We propose a non-representationalist framework for deep learning relying on a novel method: computational phenomenology, a dialogue between the first-person perspective (relying on phenomenology) and the mechanisms of computational models. We thereby reject the modern cognitivist interpretation of deep learning, according to which artificial neural networks encode representations of external...
Abstract Recent research has demonstrated the potential of psychedelic therapy for mental health care. However, the psychological experience underlying its therapeutic effects remains poorly understood. This paper proposes a framework that suggests psychedelics act as destabilizers, both psychologically and neurophysiologically. Drawing on the ‘entropic brain’ hypothesis and the ‘RElaxed...
This paper proposes an account of neurocognitive activity without leveraging the notion of neural representation. Neural representation is a concept that results from assuming that the properties of the models used in computational cognitive neuroscience (e.g., information, representation, etc.) must literally exist the system being modelled (e.g., the brain). Computational models are important...
This aim of this paper is two-fold: it critically analyses and rejects accounts blending active inference as theory of mind and enactivism; and it advances an enactivist-dynamic understanding of social cognition that is compatible with active inference. While some social cognition theories seemingly take an enactive perspective on social cognition, they explain it as the attribution of mental...
There are two fundamental models to understanding the phenomenon of natural life. One is the computational model, which is based on the symbolic thinking paradigm. The other is the biological organism model. The common difficulty attributed to these paradigms is that their reductive tools allow the phenomenological aspects of experience to remain hidden behind yes/no responses (behavioral...
Several studies suggest that the disorders of the self include a disturbance of the most elementary component of self - the minimal self. Characterizing these disorders and understanding the mechanisms involved remain a challenge to medical epistemology and health care professionals. In the present work, I bring together concepts of different fields, such as neuroscience, epistemology and...
Kurt Gödel wrote (1964, p. 272), after he had read Husserl, that the notion of objectivity raises a question: "the question of the objective existence of the objects of mathematical intuition (which, incidentally, is an exact replica of the question of the objective existence of the outer world)". This "exact replica" brings to mind the close analogy Husserl saw between our intuition of...