Perceptual consciousness and intensional transitive verbs
Justin D’Ambrosio, Daniel Stoljar
Philosophical Studies September 26, 2023 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-023-01992-w (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 24 |
| Key points | Argues that the presentation problem—the apparent inconsistency between being conscious of something in every perceptual experience and there being nothing of which one is conscious in hallucinations—can be resolved by treating 'conscious of' as an intensional transitive verb with readings that lack a direct object or theme. Proposes that this semantic approach also serves as a metaphysical account of conscious states. |
Abstract
Abstract There is good reason to think that, in every case of perceptual consciousness, there is something of which we are conscious; but there is also good reason to think that, in some cases of perceptual consciousness—for instance, hallucinations—there is nothing of which we are conscious. This paper resolves this inconsistency—which we call the presentation problem—by (a) arguing that ‘conscious of’ and related expressions function as intensional transitive verbs and (b) defending a particular semantic approach to such verbs, on which they have readings that lack direct objects or themes. The paper further argues that this approach serves not only as a linguistic proposal about the semantics of ‘conscious of’, but also as a proposal about the metaphysics of conscious states.