The Phenomenal Conception
Ignorance and Imagination July 1, 2006 DOI: 10.1093/0195306589.003.0001 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the problem of experience concerns events defined by "something it is like" to undergo them, and that this characterization leaves open various metaphysical and epistemological questions about mind, qualia, and consciousness. |
Abstract
AbstractThe question “what is the problem of experience” can be divided into two: what is the topic of the problem of experience, and what problem or problems are we raising about the topic. In this chapter, the author identifies the topic: events of experience whose defining characteristic is that there is something it is like to undergo them. Conceiving of experiences this way leaves open many issues that are philosophically controversial, issues such metaphysics of mind, ontology, qualia, consciousness, access versus phenomenal consciousness, and the diaphanousness or transparency of experience.