This chapter argues that there is a fascinating tension between Armstrong’s perceptual or self-scanning model of introspection, and his account of the function of consciousness. The account of the function of consciousness is roughly that consciousness is necessary for purposive thought: in order to think things through, we must keep track of and be aware of our various thoughts. Thus,...
This chapter distinguishes two species of functionalism: what Ned Block called, ‘functional specifier functionalism’ (now often called ‘realizer functionalism’) and ‘functional identity functionalism’ (now often called ‘role functionalism’). The first species of functionalism was defended by Armstrong and by David Lewis, and remains the dominant strain in Australian philosophy of mind. The...
This chapter presents Armstrong’s last paper on philosophy of mind, where he recounts the origins of David Lewis’s seminal paper ‘An Argument for the Identity Theory’ which appeared in 1966, two years before Armstrong’s book. Armstrong situates Lewis’s theory in relation to his own theory and in so doing adds an important seam to the familiar narrative of how the causal theory of mind emerged...