Non-standard Physicalism
May 17, 2023 DOI: 10.4324/9780429324017-3 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the epistemic view undermines arguments that physicalism is incompatible with phenomenal consciousness and is preferable to alternative approaches. It further contends that the common assumption that consciousness science aims to discover laws linking every conscious state to a physical state should be replaced by a more modest and defensible conception of the science of consciousness. |
Abstract
This chapter introduces the main issues, including in particular the ignorance hypothesis, the epistemic view, and non-standard physicalism more generally. Part I: What Consciousness Is: This section explains what consciousness in the phenomenal sense is (i.e., phenomenal consciousness) and how it relates to consciousness in other senses, that is, higher-order and access consciousness. Part II: Consciousness and the World: This section sets out (a) the arguments for thinking that physicalism is incompatible with the existence of phenomenal consciousness, (b) how the epistemic view undermines those arguments, and (c) how this approach is better than alternative. Part III: The Metaphysics of the Science of Consciousness: This section examines what the science of consciousness is and what it might be once the epistemic view is adopted. It focuses in particular on the common idea that (a) there are laws connecting every conscious state with some physical state, and (b) that consciousness science aims at providing systematic information about those laws. The section argues that this assumption should be replaced with a more modest and defensible conception of the science of consciousness.