This chapter provides an overview of the role of introspection in the debate over the nature of perceptual experience. I go through the main views of perceptual experience and look at some of the introspective claims that have been used to argue for or against those views. Along the way, I consider the relevance of introspection to recent debates about “laws of appearance” and the format of...
According to representationalists, sensory consciousness is a matter of representing the world to be a certain way. Some (Armstrong, Tye, Dretske) have suggested that representationalism fits well with the idea that consciousness can be reduced to something physical. Others think that representationalism makes the mind–body problem harder because our usual models for reducing representation do...
AbstractThis chapter argues for primitivism about sensory consciousness. On primitivism, sensory consciousness cannot be fully reductively explained in physical or functional terms. The chapter's arguement for primitivism is not based on the usual a priori considerations, for instance the knowledge argument, the explanatory gap, or the thesis of revelation. Instead, the argument is based on a...