A Simple View of Consciousness
The Waning of Materialism March 25, 2010 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0002 (opens in new tab)
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractSensory consciousness cannot be fully explained in physical or functional terms. This argument for primitivism does not rely on common a priori reasoning such as the knowledge argument or the explanatory gap. Instead, it draws on a philosophical claim about the structure of consciousness combined with an empirical claim about its physical basis.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that sensory consciousness is primitive and cannot be fully reductively explained in physical or functional terms, based on a philosophical claim about the structure of consciousness and an empirical claim about its physical basis. |
Abstract
AbstractThis chapter argues for primitivism about sensory consciousness. On primitivism, sensory consciousness cannot be fully reductively explained in physical or functional terms. The chapter's arguement for primitivism is not based on the usual a priori considerations, for instance the knowledge argument, the explanatory gap, or the thesis of revelation. Instead, the argument is based on a philosophical claim about the structure of consciousness together with an empirical claim about its physical basis.