A Simple View of Consciousness
The Waning of Materialism March 25, 2010 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0002 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that sensory consciousness is primitive and cannot be fully reductively explained in physical or functional terms, based on a philosophical claim about the structure of consciousness and an empirical claim about its physical basis. |
Abstract
AbstractThis chapter argues for primitivism about sensory consciousness. On primitivism, sensory consciousness cannot be fully reductively explained in physical or functional terms. The chapter's arguement for primitivism is not based on the usual a priori considerations, for instance the knowledge argument, the explanatory gap, or the thesis of revelation. Instead, the argument is based on a philosophical claim about the structure of consciousness together with an empirical claim about its physical basis.