A Simple View of Consciousness
The Waning of Materialism March 25, 2010 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0002 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that sensory consciousness is primitive and cannot be fully reductively explained in physical or functional terms, based on a philosophical claim about the structure of consciousness and an empirical claim about its physical basis. |
Abstract
AbstractThis chapter argues for primitivism about sensory consciousness. On primitivism, sensory consciousness cannot be fully reductively explained in physical or functional terms. The chapter's arguement for primitivism is not based on the usual a priori considerations, for instance the knowledge argument, the explanatory gap, or the thesis of revelation. Instead, the argument is based on a philosophical claim about the structure of consciousness together with an empirical claim about its physical basis.
Citations in the library
Cited by 4
- THE SIGNIFICANCE ARGUMENT FOR THE IRREDUCIBILITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS Philosophical Perspectives December 1, 2017
- Searching for Revelation Pacific philosophical quarterly September 28, 2026
- The Phenomenal Concept Strategy and Chalmers’s Dilemma The Matter of Consciousness March 2, 2023
- Panpsychism, Conceivability, and Dualism Redux Synthesis philosophica 2019
Cites 6
- On a confusion about a function of consciousness Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995
- Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness Cambridge University Press eBooks March 29, 2004
- What to say to a skeptical metaphysician: a defense manual for cognitive and behavioral scientists. Behavioral and Brain Sciences October 1, 2004
- What Am I? February 21, 2002
- The Significance of Consciousness July 27, 1998
and 1 more in the library