The Role of Introspection in the Philosophy of Perception
May 22, 2026 DOI: 10.4324/9781003393269-33 (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe chapter surveys how introspection is used to argue for and against competing theories of perceptual experience, such as representationalism, naïve realism, and sense-datum theory. It examines introspective claims about the character of visual experience, the alleged "laws of appearance" governing how objects look, and whether perceptual experience has a propositional or imagistic format. The author also considers the role of introspection in psychophysics, noting both its historical importance and its limitations as a source of evidence. Throughout, the chapter treats introspection as a contested but indispensable tool for theorizing about perception.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Introspection Perception Relevance law Consciousness Qualia |
| Key finding | Argues that introspection plays a central but contested role in debates about the nature, laws, and format of perceptual experience. |
Abstract
This chapter provides an overview of the role of introspection in the debate over the nature of perceptual experience. I go through the main views of perceptual experience and look at some of the introspective claims that have been used to argue for or against those views. Along the way, I consider the relevance of introspection to recent debates about “laws of appearance” and the format of perceptual experience. At the end, I briefly discuss the role of introspection in psychophysics.