Representationalism about Consciousness
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness July 9, 2020 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.19 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 23 |
| Key points | Argues that representationalism can be formulated, supported by an argument, and subjected to objections, and that it admits of both reductive and nonreductive interpretations. |
Abstract
According to representationalists, sensory consciousness is a matter of representing the world to be a certain way. Some (Armstrong, Tye, Dretske) have suggested that representationalism fits well with the idea that consciousness can be reduced to something physical. Others think that representationalism makes the mind–body problem harder because our usual models for reducing representation do not apply in the special case of conscious representation. This chapter formulates representationalism, discusses an argument for it, and considers standard objections. The chapter concludes by looking at reductive and nonreductive representationalism.