Perceptual Experience
September 1, 2022
Christopher S. Hill
Abstract Chapter 5 is concerned with the phenomenological dimensions of perceptual experience. Building on the idea that all awareness is constitutively representational, it infers that awareness is always governed by a Kantian appearance/reality distinction—there is the way that awareness represents entities as being, and the way that represented entities are in themselves. It follows that...
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness
July 9, 2020
Christopher S. Hill
This chapter is concerned with relationships between three forms of consciousness and three types of memory. The three forms of consciousness are introspective consciousnessaccess consciousnessand phenomenal consciousness.There are three types of memory that are arguably connected, either directly or indirectly, with one or more of the aforementioned forms of consciousness—long-term memory,...
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
March 15, 2019
Christopher S. Hill
The doctrine that mental states are identical with physical states has long played a prominent role in theories of mind and consciousness. The most widely discussed version of the doctrine, known as ‘type physicalism’, is concerned with qualitative states of consciousness – that is, with states like pain, itching, the way oranges taste, the way onions smell, and the way scarlet objects look...
Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science
May 29, 2018
Christopher S. Hill
20 citations
Although there is much talk in various literatures of streams of consciousness, and most of us have an intuitive understanding of such talk, we are far from having a full grasp of what it is that unifies streams of consciousness, binding together the individual experiences that serve as their constituents. In recent years, discussion of this topic has been principally concerned with synchronic...
The Philosophical Review
October 1, 1993
Frank Jackson, Christopher S. Hill
201 citations
Preface Part I. Introduction: 1. Topics and themes Part II. The Mind-Body Problem: 2. The failings of dualism and the double-aspect theory 3. The failings of functionalism 4. In defense of type materialism Part III. Introspection: 5. Introspective awareness of sensations 6. Introspection and the skeptic Part IV. Sensory Concepts: 7. Concepts of bodily sensations: Their semantic properties 8....