Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism.
Frank Jackson, Christopher S. Hill
The Philosophical Review October 1, 1993 DOI: 10.2307/2185695 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 201 |
Abstract
Preface Part I. Introduction: 1. Topics and themes Part II. The Mind-Body Problem: 2. The failings of dualism and the double-aspect theory 3. The failings of functionalism 4. In defense of type materialism Part III. Introspection: 5. Introspective awareness of sensations 6. Introspection and the skeptic Part IV. Sensory Concepts: 7. Concepts of bodily sensations: Their semantic properties 8. Concepts of visual sensations: Their content and their deployment Part V. Other Minds: 9. Knowledge of other minds 10. Unity of consciousness, other minds, and phenomenal space Index.