Perceptual Phenomenology
Perceptual Experience September 1, 2022 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192867766.003.0005 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that since all awareness is constitutively representational, awareness of perceptual phenomenology is subject to a Kantian appearance/reality distinction, and that this distinction undercuts the main arguments for dualism, which assume full and unerring access to phenomenal properties' essential natures. The author also proposes extending this representationalist account to cognitive phenomenology and the phenomenology of moods and emotions. |
Abstract
Abstract Chapter 5 is concerned with the phenomenological dimensions of perceptual experience. Building on the idea that all awareness is constitutively representational, it infers that awareness is always governed by a Kantian appearance/reality distinction—there is the way that awareness represents entities as being, and the way that represented entities are in themselves. It follows that awareness of perceptual phenomenology is governed by an appearance/reality distinction. The chapter points out that the main arguments for dualism presuppose that this is not the case—they assume that awareness of phenomenal properties gives us full and unerring access to their essential natures. Hence, the Kantian appearance/reality distinction undercuts the arguments for dualism. The chapter also adds to the arguments for representationalism that are presented in Chapter 1, and maintains that its representationalist account of perceptual phenomenology can be extended so as to apply to cognitive phenomenology and the phenomenology of moods and emotions.