3 papers in the library · publishing 2011-2018
Oxford Scholarship Online November 22, 2018 Gerald Vision
Unlike brute ‘entities’, if conscious states (c-states) are brute, it will be a consequence of their primitive—viz., not admitting further elaboration—connection to their material base, what is commonly known as emergence. One might suppose the chief challenge to emergence comes from various materialist counter-proposals. However, given the distinctive character of c-states, a class of critics...
The MIT Press eBooks July 29, 2011 Gerald Vision
This chapter tackles the theories that identify conscious properties and physical types. Specifically, it highlights the differences between chauvinism and pluralism. While chauvinists regard that the exclusive basis for having or ascribing phenomenal consciousness lies in the possession of a constitution approximating that of humans, pluralists tolerate differently constituted creatures as...
The MIT Press eBooks July 29, 2011 Gerald Vision
This chapter explains the argument positing that certain effects or instances of behavior are not possible without access-conscious causes. Some claim that phenomenal awareness is not a distinct category of items but an ingredient of access-conscious properties. The natural contrasts of access consciousness would not be a lack of unmediated inner recognition and transparency, but it would...