ISSN 0031-8108
8 papers in the library · 387 citations · publishing 1993-2026
The Philosophical Review 2026 David Suarez
Doyon’s book aims to demonstrate that perceptual experience is oriented by norms of coherence and optimality, and that it is in virtue of this orientation that perceptions count as perceptions in the first place. Doyon contends that these norms should not be understood merely as epistemic norms but instead as sui generis, belonging to the internal structure of perceptual experience itself and...
The Philosophical Review April 1, 2023 Angela Mendelovici, David Bourget
Michael Tye is perhaps best known for his defense of tracking representationalism, a view that combines representationalism (the view that an experience’s phenomenal character is determined by its representational content) with a tracking theory of representation (the view that mental representation is a matter of causal covariation, carrying information, or, more generally, tracking). In...
The Philosophical Review July 1, 2019 Monima Chadha 1 citation
Jonardon Ganeri's Attention, Not Self is groundbreaking. It shows a way to transform the rich theoretical vocabulary in Pāli commentarial tradition for concepts of mind, consciousness, and conscious states into an empirically informed philosophy of mind. The book is focused on commentaries attributed to a single philosopher, the fifth-century Theravāda monk Buddhaghosa. The title of the book...
The Philosophical Review April 1, 2012 Robert van Gulick
In “Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem,” Michael Tye (2006) presents an argument by which he claims to show the inconceivability of beings that are functionally equivalent to phenomenally conscious beings but lack any qualia. On that basis, he concludes that qualia can be fully defined in functional terms. The argument does not suffice to establish the claimed results. In particular it...
The Philosophical Review October 1, 2010 Michael LeBuffe
Spinoza's remarks about consciousness in the Ethics constitute two theories about conscious experience and knowledge. Several remarks, including 3p9 and 4p8, make the point that self knowledge—an especially valuable good for Spinoza—is not available to introspection. We are, as a matter of course, conscious of ourselves, but we do not, as a matter of course, know ourselves. A second group of...
The Philosophical Review July 1, 2007 Benj Hellie 14 citations
For an experience to be phenomenally conscious is for there to be something it’s like; our talk about phenomenal consciousness accordingly is permeated by the expression ‘there’s something it’s like’. It would be natural for the linguistically inclined philosopher to react to this situation by trying to advance investigations into the nature of phenomenal consciousness by determining what we...
The Philosophical Review April 1, 1995 Frances Egan 171 citations
The dominant program in cognitive psychology since the demise of behaviorism in the 1960s has been computationalism. Computational theories treat human cognitive processes as a species of information processing, and the systems that implement such processing as symbol-manipulating systems. Describing a device as a symbol manipulator implies that it is possible to treat some of its internal...
The Philosophical Review October 1, 1993 Frank Jackson, Christopher S. Hill 201 citations
Preface Part I. Introduction: 1. Topics and themes Part II. The Mind-Body Problem: 2. The failings of dualism and the double-aspect theory 3. The failings of functionalism 4. In defense of type materialism Part III. Introspection: 5. Introspective awareness of sensations 6. Introspection and the skeptic Part IV. Sensory Concepts: 7. Concepts of bodily sensations: Their semantic properties 8....