Monism and the Mind-Body Debate
Monism Matters August 13, 2026 DOI: 10.1093/9780198931560.003.0002 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that type monism is conceptually important for motivating and understanding physicalism, idealism, and neutral monism, and that its neglect stems from a two-theory focus, independence of some debates, and deference to science. |
Abstract
Abstract The relevant sort of monism is type monism, according to which all actual, concrete phenomena are such that there is exactly one unified, substantive, fundamental nature that they share. Considerations about monism help (i) motivate physicalism, idealism, and neutral monism; (ii) ground a traditional taxonomy in the philosophy of mind; (iii) explain core commitments of physicalism, idealism, and neutral monism; and (iv) address other mind–body issues, such as how to define the physical for the purposes of formulating physicalism and rival theories. Nevertheless, in the contemporary literature on the mind-body debate, explicit discussion of monism is relatively rare. Why? Three factors are identified: a tendency to focus on only two theories, physicalism and dualism; the fact that some contemporary debates seem largely independent of considerations about monism; and a positivist-influenced tendency to defer to science when it comes to ontology.