A DEFENSE OF THE NECESSARY UNITY OF PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS
Pacific philosophical quarterly March 1, 2010 DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2009.01356.x (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 6 |
| Key points | Argues that Michael Tye's argument against phenomenal unity, based on split-brain cases, fails because it relies on a questionable analysis of the data and implies that split-brain patients are not single subjects in experiments, which would neutralize the threat to the unity thesis. |
Abstract
Abstract Some argue that split‐brain cases undermine the thesis that phenomenal consciousness is necessarily unified. This paper defends the phenomenal unity thesis against Michael Tye's (2003 ) version of that argument. Two problems are identified. First, his argument relies on a questionable analysis of the split‐brain data. Second, his analysis leads to the view that in experimental situations split‐brain patients are not single subjects – a result that would render the analysis harmless to the phenomenal unity thesis.