ISSN 0031-5621
6 papers in the library · 7 citations · publishing 2010-2026
Pacific philosophical quarterly September 28, 2026 Connor Quinn
ABSTRACT Some philosophers advance revelation theses in defense of antiphysicalism about consciousness. I argue that recent formulations of Revelation, including both essence‐based and epistemic formulations, are not satisfactory for the purposes to which these philosophers have put them. First, I clarify the motivations behind the search for Revelation and introduce some desiderata any such...
Pacific philosophical quarterly June 1, 2026 Lei Zhong
ABSTRACT: Philosophers have long debated whether phenomenal properties can play genuine causal roles. In this article, I aim to develop an emergentist approach to phenomenal causality, an approach that attributes novel causal powers to phenomenal properties and rejects the causal closure of physics. I also compare this emergentist approach with an influential competing approach to phenomenal...
Pacific philosophical quarterly September 1, 2018 Pat Lewtas
Abstract: This article uses causation to show that panpsychism and emergentism share far less than most philosophers suppose. It argues that panpsychism has features, among them its rationalism, that force what the article calls a strong account of causation. And that emergentism entails what the article calls a weak account of causation incompatible with any strong account. The article then...
Pacific philosophical quarterly August 14, 2018 Matthew J Davidson 1 citation
Abstract In this article, I explore various views on which mind–body dualism is true, but the soul is located in the body. I argue that this sort of dualism (which I call ‘somatic dualism’) once was a not‐uncommon view in the philosophy of mind. I also argue that it has the resources to reply to some of the problems thought to affect Cartesian dualism.
Pacific philosophical quarterly April 1, 2018 Ben White
Abstract: This article argues that standard causal and functionalist definitions of realization fail to account for the realization of entities that cannot be individuated in causal or functional terms. By modifying such definitions to require that realizers also logically suffice for any historical properties of the entities they realize, one can provide for the realization of entities whose...
Pacific philosophical quarterly March 1, 2010 Torin Alter 6 citations
Abstract Some argue that split‐brain cases undermine the thesis that phenomenal consciousness is necessarily unified. This paper defends the phenomenal unity thesis against Michael Tye's (2003 ) version of that argument. Two problems are identified. First, his argument relies on a questionable analysis of the split‐brain data. Second, his analysis leads to the view that in experimental...