Abstract This paper investigates whether the concept of “phenomenal consciousness” is an integral component of ordinary folk psychology or a theoretical construct devised within a specific epistemic community. Advocates of what I term the Folk- “Consciousness” Thesis argue that laypeople already possess such a concept, citing experimental findings in support of this view. In contrast, I draw on...
Abstract This review critically examines Frances Egan’s Deflating Mental Representation (MIT Press, 2025), a seminal work in the philosophy of mind that challenges traditional conceptions of mental representation and intentionality. Egan argues for a deflationary account wherein ascriptions of content to mental states are pragmatically grounded and serve primarily as explanatory tools, rather...
One of the most challenging positions in contemporary philosophy of animal consciousness is that proposed by Peter Carruthers (2018a, 2018b, 2019, 2020). According to Carruthers, there is no fact of the matter about whether animals instantiate conscious states. This radical conclusion arises from the conjunction of two theses he endorses: the global workspace theory and the phenomenal concept...