Skip to content

What is Cognition? Extended Cognition and the Criterion of the Cognitive

Mark Rowlands

Social Brain, Distributed Mind April 29, 2010 DOI: 10.5871/bacad/9780197264522.003.0016 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that the three ostensibly distinct objections to the extended mind thesis all reduce to the claim that arguments for extension only establish the embedded mind thesis, and that these objections can be resolved by providing an adequate and properly motivated criterion of the cognitive.

Abstract

According to the thesis of the extended mind, at least some cognitive processes extend into the cognizing subject's environment in the sense that they are composed of processes of manipulation, exploitation, and transformation performed by that subject on suitable environmental structures. In contrast, according to the thesis of the embedded mind, the manipulation, exploitation, and transformation of information-bearing structures provides a useful scaffolding which facilitates cognitive processes but does not, even in part, constitute them. The two theses are distinct but often confused. The extended mind has attracted three ostensibly distinct kinds of objection, all of which on further analysis reduce to the idea that the arguments for the extended mind in fact only establish the thesis of the embedded mind. This chapter argues that these three objections can all be resolved by the provision of an adequate and properly motivated criterion of the cognitive.

Citations in the library

Explore topics