Ellia, F., Chis-Ciure, R. - Consciousness and Complexity: Neurobiological Naturalism and Integrated Information Theory (2022)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Neurobiological Naturalism and Integrated Information Theory are constitutionally different in their ontology and epistemology, with IIT treating consciousness as fundamental and NN treating it as an emergent property of living organisms. |
Abstract
In this paper we take a meta-theoretical stance to compare two frameworks that endeavor to explain phenomenal experience. In particular, we compare Feinberg & Mallatt’s Neurobiological Naturalism (NN) and Tononi and colleagues’ Integrated Information Theory (IIT), given that the former pointed out some similarities between the two theories (Feinberg & Mallatt 2016c-d). To probe how similar they are, we first give a general introduction to both frameworks. Next, we provide a ground plan for carrying out our analysis. We move on to articulate a philosophical profile of NN and IIT, addressing their ontological commitments and epistemological foundations. Finally, we compare the two point-by-point, also discussing how they stand on the issue of artificial consciousness. We find the two theories to be constitutionally different. IIT treats consciousness as a fundamental feature of the world (its ontology) and investigates its structure from the mathematical standpoint of integrated information (its epistemology). NN, by contrast, treats consciousness as an emerging feature confined to living organisms with complex brains (its ontology) and investigates with neurobiology, complex systems theory, and the tenet of irreducible subjectivity (its epistemology).