Consciousness and complexity: Neurobiological naturalism and integrated information theory.

This paper compares two conceptual frameworks for explaining phenomenal experience: Neurobiological Naturalism (NN) by Feinberg & Mallatt and Integrated Information Theory (IIT) by Tononi and colleagues. The authors first introduce each framework, then outline a plan for analysis, articulate the philosophical profiles of NN and IIT—including their ontological commitments and epistemological foundations—and finally compare them point-by-point, including their positions on artificial consciousness. The analysis is meta-theoretical, assessing similarities previously noted by Feinberg & Mallatt.

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Abstract

In this paper we take a meta-theoretical stance and compare and assess two conceptual frameworks that endeavor to explain phenomenal experience. In particular, we compare Feinberg & Mallatt's Neurobiological Naturalism (NN) and Tononi's and colleagues Integrated Information Theory (IIT), given that the former pointed out some similarities between the two theories (Feinberg & Mallatt 2016c-d). To probe their similarity, we first give a general introduction into both frameworks. Next, we expound a ground-plan for carrying out our analysis. We move on to articulate a philosophical profile of NN and IIT, addressing their ontological commitments and epistemological foundations. Finally, we compare the two point-by-point, also discussing how they stand on the issue of artificial consciousness.