The Representational Character of Experience
Oxford University Press eBooks October 7, 2010 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.003.0011 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 234 |
| Key points | Argues that a nonreductive, narrow, and Fregean variety of representationalism best accounts for the relationship between phenomenal character and intentional content in perceptual states, contrasting with more widely explored forms. |
Abstract
This chapter analyzes aspects of the relationship between consciousness and intentionality. It focuses on the phenomenal character and the intentional content of perceptual states, canvassing various possible relations among them. It argues that there is a good case for a sort of representationalism, although this may not take the form that its advocates often suggest. By mapping out some of the landscape, the chapter tries to open up territory for different and promising forms of representationalism to be explored in the future. In particular, it argues for a nonreductive, narrow, and Fregean variety of representationalism, which contrasts strongly with more widely explored varieties. It concludes with some words about the fundamental relationship between consciousness and intentionality.