Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences
September 19, 2018
Michael Pitts, Lydia A Lutsyshyna, Steven A. Hillyard
135 citations
A review of tensions between global neuronal workspace theory and recurrent processing theory focuses on their differing views on the relationship between attention and consciousness. The authors argue that both theories offer key insights that can be reconciled into a novel framework. They propose an updated taxonomy of conscious and non-conscious states that incorporates a wider spectrum by integrating contemporary views on attentional mechanisms interacting with sensory processing. The framework considers whether certain types of attention are necessary for phenomenal and access consciousness. Recent 'no-report' paradigms are reviewed, and methodological misunderstandings are addressed to clarify how to identify the neural basis of perceptual awareness.
PLoS One
February 10, 2023
Lucia Melloni, Liad Mudrik, Michael Pitts et al.
106 citations
An adversarial collaboration between proponents of Global Neuronal Workspace and Integrated Information Theory devised and preregistered two experiments that test contrasting predictions about the location and timing of correlates of visual consciousness. Six theory-impartial laboratories will follow the study protocol using fMRI, M-EEG, and intracranial EEG, with built-in replications between labs and within datasets. The project aims to provide decisive evidence for or against the two theories and clarify the neural footprints of conscious visual perception, while modeling large-scale, collaborative, and open science practice.
Nature
June 1, 2025
Oscar Ferrante, Urszula Gorska-Klimowska, Simon Henin et al.
94 citations
Different theories explain how subjective experience arises from brain activity. An open science adversarial collaboration directly juxtaposed integrated information theory (IIT) and global neuronal workspace theory (GNWT). Human participants (n = 256) viewed suprathreshold stimuli for variable durations while neural activity was measured with fMRI, MEG, and intracranial EEG. Information about conscious content was found in visual, ventrotemporal, and inferior frontal cortex, with sustained responses in occipital and lateral temporal cortex reflecting stimulus duration, and content-specific synchronization between frontal and early visual areas. These results align with some predictions of IIT and GNWT but substantially challenge key tenets of both theories, including a lack of sustained posterior cortex synchronization for IIT and a lack of ignition at stimulus offset and limited prefrontal representation for GNWT.
bioRxiv Preprint Server
June 10, 2021
Itay Yaron, Lucia Melloni, Michael Pitts et al.
21 citations
preprint
A bird's-eye analysis of 412 experiments on the neuroscience of consciousness reveals that methodological choices alone can predict which of four leading theories a study will support, regardless of the actual findings. Most studies interpret their results after the fact rather than testing critical predictions in advance. This suggests that the field's theoretical commitments may be driven more by how experiments are designed than by the evidence itself. The authors provide an open-access website for further exploration of these trends.
The Behavioral and brain sciences
July 22, 2025
François Stockart, Maor Schreiber, Pietro Amerio et al.
20 citations
The scope of unconscious processing remains hotly debated, driven by diverse methods for manipulating and measuring perceptual awareness. Through dialogue among researchers with varied theoretical backgrounds, ten recommendations and nine outstanding issues are provided for designing experimental paradigms, analyzing data, and reporting results. These guidelines aim to evoke discussion about norms in studying unconscious processes and help researchers make informed decisions. While some recommendations may not align with existing approaches and will likely evolve, they are intended to foster a more convergent understanding of the extent and limits of unconscious processing.
Cerebral cortex (New York, N.Y. : 1991)
November 5, 2024
Michael A Cohen, Cole Dembski, Kevin Ortego et al.
20 citations
Using electroencephalography and a no-report visual masking paradigm, stimulus visibility was manipulated by varying the time between stimuli and masks in linear steps (17, 33, 50, 67, and 83 ms). Awareness increased nonlinearly, with stimuli never seen at the two shortest intervals, always seen at the two longest, and 50% seen at the intermediate interval. A neural signal closely linked to perceptual awareness, independent of task, was identified: a fronto-central event-related potential called the N2 (~250 to 300 ms). Earlier signals reflected the linear manipulation of stimulus strength, while later signals like P3b and temporal generalization of decoding were tied to task performance, appearing only in the report condition. These findings inform debates regarding theories of consciousness.
The Journal of neuroscience : the official journal of the Society for Neuroscience
February 21, 2024
Yunkai Zhu, Charlotte Li, Camille Hendry et al.
8 citations
A left-lateralized, near-vertex negativity in EEG, occurring 200–300 ms after stimulus onset, distinguishes sine-wave speech tokens perceived as speech from those perceived as noise, even when task-irrelevant. This response, interpreted as a phonological perceptual awareness negativity, was absent for frequency-flipped control tokens never perceived as speech. The P3b component was enhanced only for tokens both perceived as speech and task-relevant. The findings suggest that neural correlates of conscious perception, across different types of conscious content, are most likely midlatency negative-going brain responses in content-specific sensory areas.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
December 17, 2025
Liad Mudrik, Nathan Faivre, Michael Pitts et al.
5 citations
A major controversy in consciousness science divides sensory and cognitive theories. Reexamining Block's 1995 distinction between phenomenal consciousness (P) and access consciousness (A), the authors argue that P and A are not two different types of consciousness but two necessary conditions for consciousness. This conceptual shift helps resolve unresolved questions about neural mechanisms, functions of consciousness, and its relationship with attention. The proposal motivates selective unification across different classes of theories.
Scientific Data
May 23, 2025
Alia Seedat, Alex Lepauvre, Jay Jeschke et al.
5 citations
An intracranial EEG dataset was collected from 38 epilepsy patients across three research centers as part of an adversarial collaboration testing Global Neuronal Workspace Theory and Integrated Information Theory. Participants viewed visual stimuli—faces, objects, letters, and false fonts—in three orientations and for three durations, performing a Go/No-Go target detection task. The dataset includes demographics, clinical information, electrode reconstructions, behavioral performance, and eye-tracking data, all converted to BIDS format. It is intended for reuse in consciousness science and vision neuroscience to investigate stimulus processing, target detection, and task-relevance.
Scientific Data
May 29, 2026
Ling Liu, Oscar Ferrante, Tara Ghafari et al.
A large-scale, multi-center dataset combines MEG, EEG, eye-tracking, and structural MRI recordings from 100 individuals (mean age 22.79, 54 female, all right-handed) across two research centers (UK and China). The data were collected through an adversarial collaboration between advocates of the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory and the Integrated Information Theory of consciousness. Participants performed a non-speeded Go/No-Go target detection task with visual stimuli from four categories (faces, objects, letters, false fonts) at different orientations and durations (0.5, 1.0, 1.5 s) under various task conditions. The dataset follows the Brain Imaging Data Structure (BIDS) and includes extensive metadata to enhance reusability.
Scientific Data
May 7, 2026
Aya Khalaf, David Richter, Yamil Vidal et al.
An adversarial collaboration between proponents of the Global Neuronal Workspace theory and the Integrated Information Theory of consciousness produced a functional magnetic resonance imaging dataset from 118 participants. Participants viewed faces, objects, letters, and false fonts presented at three orientations and three durations (0.5, 1.0, 1.5 seconds) while identifying infrequent targets. Two categories were task-relevant and two were task-irrelevant in each block. The simple design makes the data broadly reusable for testing predictions from other theories of consciousness and for examining visual processing. Anonymized data, quality reports, demographics, behavioral performance, and eye-tracking data are publicly accessible.
bioRxiv Preprint Server
June 23, 2023
Oscar Ferrante, Urszula Gorska-Klimowska, Simon Henin et al.
preprint
An open science adversarial collaboration directly juxtaposed Integrated Information Theory (IIT) and Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNWT) by investigating neural correlates of visual experience. 256 human subjects viewed suprathreshold stimuli for variable durations while neural activity was measured with fMRI, MEG, and ECoG. Information about conscious content was found in visual, ventro-temporal, and inferior frontal cortex, with sustained responses in occipital and lateral temporal cortex reflecting stimulus duration, and content-specific synchronization between frontal and early visual areas.
The Journal of neuroscience : the official journal of the Society for Neuroscience
September 15, 2021
Torge Dellert, Miriam Müller-Bardorff, Insa Schlossmacher et al.
Conscious visual perception of faces is linked to early processing in sensory brain regions, especially the fusiform gyrus, rather than requiring later widespread frontoparietal network activity. Using simultaneous EEG-fMRI and an inattentional blindness paradigm with three identical phases, participants either spontaneously noticed or remained blind to faces during a distractor task. Bayesian analysis showed conscious face perception most strongly activated the fusiform gyrus (fMRI) and produced the N170 and visual awareness negativity (EEG), with smaller effects in occipital and prefrontal cortex. In contrast, task-relevant face processing activated extensive occipitotemporal, frontoparietal, and attentional networks and elicited a pronounced P3b component, suggesting strong frontoparietal activity and the P3b reflect task-related processes rather than consciousness itself.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
June 22, 2021
C. Dembski, Christof Koch, Michael Pitts
The P3b brain wave is not a reliable marker of conscious perception, as many experiments have failed to observe it during conscious experience. In contrast, the visual and auditory awareness negativity (VAN and AAN) have not been dissociated from consciousness, and a similar signal correlates with tactile consciousness. These awareness negativities are likely generated in sensory cortices and can be maximal contralateral to the stimulus, suggesting a generalized perceptual awareness negativity (PAN) that marks the onset of sensory consciousness.
Science
May 28, 2021
L. Melloni, L. Mudrik, Michael Pitts et al.
Consciousness remains a hard problem: why does neural activity produce subjective experience, like the taste of chocolate or the feeling of a caress? Understanding this has medical and ethical implications, from assessing consciousness after brain injury to deciding whether nonhuman animals, fetuses, organoids, or advanced machines are conscious. A comprehensive theory is needed to determine which systems experience anything and to define ethical boundaries. An adversarial collaboration championing open science aims to test whether major current theories hold up.
March 10, 2021
C. Dembski, C. Koch, Michael Pitts
preprint
A critical review of EEG and MEG markers of the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) for visual, auditory, and tactile stimuli concludes that two prominent signals—the early, modality-specific visual and auditory awareness negativities (VAN and AAN) and the late, modality-independent P3b—are not equally valid NCC. More than twelve studies found the P3b absent despite conscious perception, ruling it out. No convincing evidence dissociates the awareness negativities from consciousness. Evidence for a tactile equivalent, the somatosensory awareness negativity (SAN), supports a generalized perceptual awareness negativity (PAN) correlated with perceptual consciousness, arising 120–200 ms after stimulus onset from sensory cortices. This PAN points to new research avenues.