We describe a theoretical model of the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying conscious presence and its disturbances. The model is based on interoceptive prediction error and is informed by predictive models of agency, general models of hierarchical predictive coding and dopaminergic signaling in cortex, the role of the anterior insular cortex (AIC) in interoception and emotion, and cognitive...
Changes in conscious level have been associated with changes in dynamical integration and segregation among distributed brain regions. Recent theoretical developments emphasize changes in directed functional (i.e., causal) connectivity as reflected in quantities such as 'integrated information' and 'causal density'. Here we develop and illustrate a rigorous methodology for assessing causal...
The cognitive sciences are increasingly coming to terms with the embodied, embedded, extended, and experiential aspects of the mind. Exemplifying this shift, the enactive approach points to an essential role of goal-directed bodily activity in the generation of meaningful perceptual experience, i.e., sense-making. Here, building on recent insights into the transformative effects of practical...
Can conscious awareness be ascertained from physiological responses alone? We evaluate a novel learning-based procedure permitting detection of conscious awareness without reliance on language comprehension or behavioural responses. The method exploits a situation whereby only consciously detected violations of an expectation alter skin conductance responses (SCRs). Thirty participants listened...
A recent measure of 'integrated information', Φ(DM), quantifies the extent to which a system generates more information than the sum of its parts as it transitions between states, possibly reflecting levels of consciousness generated by neural systems. However, Φ(DM) is defined only for discrete Markov systems, which are unusual in biology; as a result, Φ(DM) can rarely be measured in practice....
The past decade has seen an explosion of interest in the neural mechanisms underlying consciousness. Experimental approaches from cognitive neuroscience that emphasize converging evidence from multiple methodologies have changed our understanding of how conscious mental states are associated with patterns of brain activity. In this special issue of Cognitive Neuroscience, we bring together five...
Abstract A satisfying neuroscience of consciousness must account for phenomenological properties in terms of neural properties. While pursuing this project may challenge our intuitions about what we are conscious of, evidence from behavior and introspection should not be discounted. All three lines of evidence need to be integrated in order to naturalize phenomenal experience.
Concepts of emergence and autonomy are central to artificial life and related cognitive and behavioral sciences. However, quantitative and easy-to-apply measures of these phenomena are mostly lacking. Here, I describe quantitative and practicable measures for both autonomy and emergence, based on the framework of multivariate autoregression and specifically Granger causality. G-autonomy...
Despite anecdotal evidence suggesting conscious states in a variety of non-human animals, no systematic neuroscientific investigation of animal consciousness has yet been undertaken. We set forth a framework for such an investigation that incorporates integration of data from neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, and behavioral studies, uses evidence from humans as a benchmark, and recognizes the...
Machine (artificial) consciousness can be interpreted in both strong and weak forms, as an instantiation or as a simulation. Here, I argue in favor of weak artificial consciousness, proposing that synthetic models of neural mechanisms potentially underlying consciousness can shed new light on how these mechanisms give rise to the phenomena they do. The approach I advocate involves using...
Synthetic methods in science can aim at either instantiating a target phenomenon or simulating key mechanisms underlying that phenomenon; 'strong' and 'weak' approaches, respectively. While the former assumes a mature theory, the latter find its value in helping specify such theories. Here, we argue that artificial consciousness is best pursued as a (weak) means of theory development in...
Neurons engage in causal interactions with one another and with the surrounding body and environment. Neural systems can therefore be analyzed in terms of causal networks, without assumptions about information processing, neural coding, and the like. Here, we review a series of studies analyzing causal networks in simulated neural systems using a combination of Granger causality analysis and...
A model of consciousness is a theoretical description that relates brain properties of consciousness (e.g., fast irregular electrical activity, widespread brain activation) to phenomenal properties of consciousness (e.g., qualia, a first-person-perspective, the unity of a conscious scene). Because of the diverse nature of these properties (Seth et al. 2005), useful models can be either...
A recent theoretical emphasis on complex interactions within neural systems underlying consciousness has been accompanied by proposals for the quantitative characterization of these interactions. In this article, we distinguish key aspects of consciousness that are amenable to quantitative measurement from those that are not. We carry out a formal analysis of the strengths and limitations of...
Conventional approaches to understanding consciousness are generally concerned with the contribution of specific brain areas or groups of neurons. By contrast, it is considered here what kinds of neural processes can account for key properties of conscious experience. Applying measures of neural integration and complexity, together with an analysis of extensive neurological data, leads to a...
Abstract Quantifying the complexity of neural activity has provided fundamental insights into cognition, consciousness, and clinical conditions. However, the most widely used approach to estimate the complexity of neural dynamics, Lempel-Ziv complexity (LZ), has fundamental limitations that substantially restrict its domain of applicability. In this article we leverage the information-theoretic...
Panpsychism is the notion that consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous in the natural world. Defenders of panpsychism appeal, at least in part, to the apparent implausibility of materialist accounts of consciousness. However, materialist accounts are more resourceful than often assumed by proponents of panpsychism, while panpsychism has insurmountable problems of its own. The real problem...