Neural theories need to account for, not discount, introspection and behavior
Cognitive Neuroscience August 18, 2010 DOI: 10.1080/17588928.2010.496533 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 3 |
| Key points | Argues that a satisfying neuroscience of consciousness must account for phenomenological properties in terms of neural properties, and that neural, behavioral, and introspective evidence should all be integrated to naturalize phenomenal experience, even if this challenges intuitions about what we are conscious of. |
Abstract
Abstract A satisfying neuroscience of consciousness must account for phenomenological properties in terms of neural properties. While pursuing this project may challenge our intuitions about what we are conscious of, evidence from behavior and introspection should not be discounted. All three lines of evidence need to be integrated in order to naturalize phenomenal experience.
Citations in the library
Cites 13
- An information integration theory of consciousness BMC Neuroscience November 2, 2004
- Consciousness as Integrated Information: a Provisional Manifesto Biological Bulletin December 1, 2008
- The Neural Correlates of Consciousness Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences March 1, 2008
- Theories and measures of consciousness: An extended framework Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences July 5, 2006
- Opposing effects of attention and consciousness on afterimages Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences April 27, 2010
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