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Philosophy of mind: all studies

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Research

What is it Like to be a Group Agent?

Noûs July 28, 2016 Christian List 179 citations

Abstract The existence of group agents is relatively widely accepted. Examples are corporations, courts, NGOs, and even entire states. But should we also accept that there is such a thing as group consciousness? I give an overview of some of the key issues in this debate and sketch a tentative argument for the view that group agents lack phenomenal consciousness ( pace Schwitzgebel ). In...

Caterpillars, consciousness and the origins of mind

Animal Sentience July 26, 2016 Arthur S. Reber 64 citations

A novel framework for the origins of consciousness and mind, the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC), is presented. The model is based on a simple, perhaps radical axiom: subjectivity is an inherent feature of particular kinds of organic form. Experiential states, including those denoted as "mind" and "consciousness," are present in the most primitive species. The model has several conceptual...

Theme Introduction: Advancing Our Understanding of Hallucinations

Schizophrenia Bulletin July 21, 2016 Susan Lee Rossell, Neil Thomas, Flavie Waters

This special theme in Schizophrenia Bulletin on Hallucinations includes three interdisciplinary articles presented at the International Consortium on Hallucination Research (ICHR) meeting in Melbourne, Australia, October 2015. 1 A common theme recapitulated through each of the reports relates to refining and/or improving our conceptualization and understanding of brain mechanisms and dynamics,...

Shall we really say goodbye to first rank symptoms?

European Psychiatry July 17, 2016 Andreas Heinz, Martin Voss, Stephen M. Lawrie et al. 84 citations

BACKGROUND: First rank symptoms (FRS) of schizophrenia have been used for decades for diagnostic purposes. In the new version of the DSM-5, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) has abolished any further reference to FRS of schizophrenia and treats them like any other "criterion A" symptom (e.g. any kind of hallucination or delusion) with regard to their diagnostic implication. The ICD-10...

“Absent Presence” – Quantum Time and Quantum Consciousness in Wilson Harris’s Palace of the Peacock

Peter Lang eBooks July 11, 2016 Barbara Lewandowska‐Tomaszczyk, Krzysztof Kosecki

They view time as observer-determined and thus shed light on multiple and often conflicting temporalities we live in, think, and talk about. Relying on empirical methods, the book explores linguistic and psychological parameters of time perception and conceptualization. It deals, among others, with temporal aspects of language acquisition, neural mechanisms of memory and attention, as well as...

Expanding the Extended Mind: Merleau-Ponty’s Late Ontology as Radical Enactive Cognition

July 8, 2016 G. Zavota

In this essay, I argue that the late ontology of Maurice MerleauPonty, in particular the system he began to develop in The Visible and the Invisible, can be conceived of as a form of Radical Enactive Cognition, as described by Hutto and Myin in Radicalizing Enactivism. I will begin by discussing Clark and Chalmers’ extended mind hypothesis, as well as the enactive view of consciousness proposed...

Answering questions about consciousness by modeling perception as covert behavior

Frontiers in Psychology July 4, 2016 Gustav eMarkkula

Two main open questions in current consciousness research concern (i) the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) and (ii) the relationship between neural activity and first-person, subjective experience. Here, possible answers are sketched for both of these, by means of a model-based analysis of what is required for one to admit having a conscious experience. To this end, a model is proposed...

DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00803 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Perception Action selection Heterophenomenology Covert behavior +1

Shadowing the wandering mind: how understanding the mind-wandering state can inform our appreciation of conscious experience.

Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science July 2016 Mahiko Konishi, Jonathan Smallwood

The mind-wandering state illustrates two fundamental aspects of consciousness: its generative nature, which is reflected by the stimulus-independent content of thought that occurs when our minds wander; and metacognition, the unique capacity of the mind to reflect and understand itself. Self-generated thought, which allows us to consider people and events that are not present in the immediate...

Comparing the experience of voices in borderline personality disorder with the experience of voices in a psychotic disorder: A systematic review.

Australian & New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry July 2016 Zalie Merrett, Susan L. Rossell, David Castle

In clinical settings, there is substantial evidence both clinically and empirically to suggest that approximately 50% of individuals with borderline personality disorder experience auditory verbal hallucinations. However, there is limited research investigating the phenomenology of these voices. The aim of this study was to review and compare our current understanding of auditory verbal...

DOI: 10.1177/0004867416632595 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Borderline personality disorder Auditory verbal hallucinations Schizophrenia Voices

Five year follow-up of non-psychotic adults with frequent auditory verbal hallucinations: are they still healthy?

Psychological Medicine July 2016 Kirstin Daalman, Kelly Diederen, L Hoekema et al.

Previously, we described 103 adults (mean age 41 years) who experienced frequent, auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH), in the absence of a need for mental healthcare. Importantly, these adults were largely past the peak incidence age for psychosis (15-35 years). It is unclear if these older individuals with AVH are still at increased risk for psychosis or other psychopathology. To address this...