Animal Sentience
August 3, 2026
Colin Klein, Andrew B Barron
Our target article, “Insects have the capacity for subjective experience,” has provoked a diverse range of commentaries. In this response we have collated what we see as the major themes of the discussion. It is clear that we differ from some commentators in our commitments to what subjective experience is and what the midbrain is capable of. Here we clarify where we stand on those points and...
Animal Sentience
August 3, 2026
Murray Shanahan
This commentary has two aims: first to clarify the behavioural grounds for the ascription of consciousness to non-human animals (including insects), and second to show how Klein & Barron’s views can be reconciled with the core claims of global workspace theory.
Animal Sentience
August 3, 2026
Yew-Kwang Ng
Reber’s axiom: “Any organism with flexible cell walls, a sensitivity to its surrounds and the capacity for locomotion will possess the biological foundations of mind and consciousness” does not seem to be supported by things we know and the logic of evolutionary biology. The latter leads to the conclusion that conscious species are flexible in their behavior (rather than in their cell walls),...
Animal Sentience
August 3, 2026
Gwen J. Broude
Reber believes he has simplified Chalmers’s “hard problem” of consciousness by arguing that subjectivity is an inherent feature of biological forms. His argument rests on the related notions of continuity of mind and gradual accretion of capacities across evolutionary time. These notions need to be defended, not just asserted. Because Reber minimizes the differences in mental faculties among...
Animal Sentience
August 3, 2026
Michael L. Woodruff
In my target article, I argued that the brains of ray-finned fishes of the teleost subclass (Actinopterygii) are sufficiently complex to support sentience — that these fishes have subjective awareness of interoceptive and exteroceptive sense experience. Extending previous theories centered on the tectum, I focused on the organization of the fish pallium. In this Response to the commentaries, I...
Animal Sentience
August 3, 2026
Carolyn A. Ristau
Donald Griffin co-discovered bat sonar and founded the field of echolocation. He studied bird migration and founded Cognitive Ethology, the study of animal awareness and mental experiences. In all these endeavors, he faced hostile opposition. The biography (Ristau 2024) examines Griffin's life and the scientific explorations by him and others in these fields. This Précis emphasizes his...
British Journal of Anaesthesia
August 1, 2026
Pilleriin Sikka, Sherry Hu, Boris D. Heifets
Dreaming during anaesthesia has been documented for over a century, yet it remains poorly understood. This scoping review synthesises evidence on the frequency, phenomenology, predictors, outcomes, and neural correlates of anaesthesia dreaming. We systematically searched multiple databases for studies examining anaesthesia dreaming, including clinical trials, observational studies, and...
Psychiatric Clinics of North America
July 23, 2026
Florestan Delcourt, Lars Siersbæk Nilsson, Andreas Rosén Rasmussen
Imagination is part of ordinary psychic life, but, in somewhat distorted forms, also an aspect of different key psychopathological concepts and hence of immediate clinical importance. In this review, we present principal findings from clinical psychopathological research examining basic disturbances of imagination in the schizophrenia spectrum, obsessive symptoms, and related phenomena in other...
Consciousness and Cognition
July 20, 2026
Marina Trakas, Ryan Daley
Research on the continuity and discontinuity between the waking and dreaming minds has largely focused on similarities and differences in waking and dream content. The present study expands this debate by examining another dimension: the relationship between the dream self and the waking self at the phenomenal level. Specifically, it investigates how bodily and affective dimensions of dream...
Inquiry
July 15, 2026
Aleks Knoks, Johan Largo, Thomas Raleigh
This paper identifies and criticizes a common line of argument for the negative conclusion that Large Language Models (LLMs) cannot think, or for the closely related conclusions that they cannot understand or that their outputs are meaningless. This line of argument can be found in several recent papers. We begin by discussing a representative example – Stoljar, D., and Z. Zhang. 2026. “Why...