Insect consciousness: Commitments, conflicts and consequences
Animal Sentience August 3, 2026 DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1181 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Evolution Cognitive neuroscience Zoology Cognition and perception Life sciences |
| Key points | Argues that the cortex is not essential for all forms of consciousness in vertebrates and that subjective experience can be supported by midbrain structures, as exemplified by insects. Proposes that functional neurobiological analyses combined with behavioral studies across diverse animals are needed to clarify how neural circuits support different conscious capacities. |
Abstract
Our target article, “Insects have the capacity for subjective experience,” has provoked a diverse range of commentaries. In this response we have collated what we see as the major themes of the discussion. It is clear that we differ from some commentators in our commitments to what subjective experience is and what the midbrain is capable of. Here we clarify where we stand on those points and how our view differs from some other influential perspectives. The commentaries have highlighted the most lively areas of disagreement. We revisit here the debates surrounding whether the cortex is essential for any form of consciousness in vertebrates, how to interpret interventionist evidence, and whether any specific behavioural criteria can be used to assess the occurrence of consciousness. We recognise that these debates will not be resolved once and for all in this discussion, and we take this opportunity to explore what new forms of experimental evidence might be needed to provide clarity. We emphasise how functional neurobiological analyses in combination with careful behavioural studies of a diverse range of animals will help progress our understanding of how neural circuits can support different forms of behaviour. Ultimately this will help us reach an understanding of how different conscious capacities could be supported by neural systems, and which animals are capable of them.
Comparable studies
Other theoretical and historical papers on philosophy of mind, most cited first.
| Study | Year | Design | Participants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: a framework linking biology, phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia. | 2003 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| From dopamine to salience to psychosis--linking biology, pharmacology and phenomenology of psychosis. | 2005 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| How do the brain's time and space mediate consciousness and its different dimensions? Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC). | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model. | 2013 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
Citations in the library
Cited by 3
- The search for invertebrate consciousness. Noûs March 1, 2022
- Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution. Neuroscience of Consciousness 2021
- A Traditional Scientific Perspective on the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness. Entropy (Basel, Switzerland) May 22, 2021
Cites 12
- If insects have phenomenal consciousness, could they suffer? Animal Sentience September 1, 2016
- Phenomenal consciousness in insects? A possible way forward Animal Sentience August 3, 2026
- Consciousness as integrated perception, motivation, cognition, and action Animal Sentience August 3, 2026
- Subjective experience in insects: Definitions and other difficulties Animal Sentience August 24, 2016
- No proof for subjective experience in insects Animal Sentience August 19, 2016
and 7 more in the library